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Abstract
Through an examination of Indonesia’s role as an aid recipient and Japan’s role as a 
major donor of international development assistance, this thesis will argue that the 
national objectives of Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) undermine 
the effectiveness of its aid. The thesis will provide an outline of Indonesia’s 
experience with foreign aid, Japan’s development of its ODA polices and how they 
were implemented in Indonesia, at the strategic level and through an examination of 
two case studies. The thesis will then finally examine the effectiveness of ODA in 
those case studies and conclude that recipient institutions in Indonesia need to be 
better placed to absorb foreign aid.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
This thesis examines the world’s fifth largest donor country, Japan, its Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) and foreign policies and development in one of the 
largest Japanese ODA recipients, Indonesia. Firstly, it briefly looks at Indonesia from 
the perspective of economic and social development and as an aid recipient. 
Secondary, it discusses Japan’s ODA, summarizing its history, current trends and 
critiques. It then investigates effectiveness of Japanese ODA with a case study of two 
Japanese ODA projects in Indonesia. Finally, this thesis examines how Japan can 
enhance its ODA qualitatively, aiming to search for better ways to lead Japan’s ODA 
to contribute to international development and prosperity.
The Need to Examine the Link between ODA and Economic Development
While there has been previous research on how Japanese foreign aid has been 
commercially and diplomatically used, there is still room for further examination 
focused on the actual connection between ODA and economic development in the 
recipient country. Notable works include David Arase’s Buying Power: the Political 
Economy o f Japan's Foreign Aid (1995) and Marie Soderberg’s the Business o f 
Japanese Foreign Aid: Five case studies from Asia. Also, Robert Cassen’s Does Aid 
Work? (1986) and Roger Riddell’s Does Foreign Aid Really Work? (2008) are 
distinguished as research in value of the current foreign aid. In Riddell’s book (2008), 
he concludes that while aid contributes to the reduction of poverty and the
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improvement of human rights of every person, it has not been proved whether or not 
most ODA has worked or failed. 1 This is because, as the same argument is seen in 
Cassen’s book, it is difficult to trace the contribution of aid to development in a 
certain recipient and therefore daunting to analyze aid effectiveness at the country- 
level. The problem here is, despite the current sharp increase in the amount of net 
ODA and extensive research on aid effectiveness, it is still controversial whether or 
not ODA can actually be a steppingstone toward further international development.
Why then do major donor countries keep providing vast amounts of ODA to 
recipients in the current international economic recession? What does each donor 
intend to achieve through its ODA? How effective has a donor country’s ODA been 
both to the country’s stability and to development in a recipient country at regional 
and project level? Finally, how can the donor improve the quality of its ODA with 
limited government budgets?
What is ODA?
Firstly, for the purpose of this paper, ODA is defined as flows of official financing 
administered in order to promote the economic development and welfare of 
developing countries. Some forms of ODA are concessional in character with a grant
1 Roger Riddell (2008) Does Foreign Aid Really Work? P254. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
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element2 3of at least 25 percent. By convention, ODA flows comprise contributions of 
donor government agencies, at all levels, to developing countries (bilateral ODA) and 
to multilateral institutions. ODA receipts comprise disbursements by bilateral donors 
and multilateral institutions.
Japanese ODA
Distinctive features of Japan’s ODA are the Asia-focused high ratio of economic 
infrastructure projects, yen loan bilateral aid and its aid planning and implementation 
carried by various governmental sectors, organizations and companies. Additionally, 
Japan’s involvement in ODA has given the country an opportunity to not only take a 
leading role and have a say in the international society, but also promote its national 
interests abroad. Not all economically advanced countries provide foreign aid purely 
because they intend to reduce poverty and promote world peace. Japan’s ODA is also 
used to advance its defense and diplomatic priorities, and the way it is distributed 
abroad attracts criticism on the international scene.
2 According to Glossary o f Statistical Terms o f OECD, the grant element reflects the financial terms o f  
a transaction: interest rate, maturity (interval to final repayment) and grace period (interval to first 
repayment o f capital). It is a measure o f the concessionality (softness) o f a loan. It is calculated as the 
difference between the face value o f a loan and the discounted present value o f the service payments 
the borrower will make over the lifetime of the loan, expressed as a percentage o f the face value.
3 OECD Glossary o f statistical terms, Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/search.asp
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A Brief Overview of Japanese PDA
Japan began to provide its foreign aid in 1954 when the country first joined the 
international development assistance program, Colombo Plan. Although the country 
has played an active role to assist developing countries since then, it was in the 1990s 
that Japan transformed itself from a main postwar aid recipient into one of the world’s 
leading donor country. Japan had received the US government Appropriation for 
Relief in Occupied Area Fund (GARIOA) and the following Economic Rehabilitation 
in Occupied Areas (EROA) for five years between 1946 and 1951 as well as low 
interest loans from the World Bank. With foreign aid from the US and the World 
Bank that are equivalent to the total of 2.6 million of those times, the country 
accelerated industrial development and accordingly accomplished high economic 
growth between 1955 and 1973. While Japan has provided a large amount of financial 
aid to other developing countries in the last few decades, it was as late as in 1990 
when this country finally completed repayments of loans from the World Bank and 
“graduated” from a recipient to an aid donor country. Based on Japan’s experience as 
a donor recipient country after its defeat in World War Two and the following great 
economic success, this country has implemented its own foreign and aid policies, 
which make Japan’s ODA unique.
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The Rationale behind Japanese PDA
Japan has provided ODA because it realizes the links between poverty and its own 
security and national prosperity. The challenge of poverty threatens stability in many 
parts of the world and this requires economically advanced countries to actively 
engage in international development. International development is seen as a means in 
which countries are able to promote stability and therefore their own long-term 
national security interests.
Linking Topical Issues to ODA
This link between security and poverty can influence advanced economies around the 
world to take action. This link may be the underlying motivation for the 2000 
Millennium Summit where 189 nations adopted and 147 world leaders signed the 
Millennium Declaration, the United Nations (UN), international organizations, non­
governmental organizations (NGO) and the signatories have worked together as one 
to achieve the global time-bounded target, the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). The MDGs are eight targets to be achieved by 2015, which addresses 
extreme poverty and hunger, education, gender exclusion, child mortality, basic 
human rights of each person to be healthy and safe, disease, environmental 
sustainability and global partnership for development. Japanese aid to Indonesia takes 
place through such high profile and broad based initiatives.
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If national interests can convincingly linked to the distribution of ODA, the result is 
often an increase in overall development allocations. According to the Organization of 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), as of 2008, the total amount of 
ODA from Development Assistance Committee (DAC) was SI 19.8 billion US dollars 
(USD).4 This was double the amount provided in 2001 and the highest dollar figure 
ever recorded. While, due to the recent worldwide recession, some member countries 
from DAC have cut the annual state budget for the ODA there is a general tendency 
for the total ODA to increase among OECD-DAC. The largest ODA volume increases 
were seen particularly in the current top donor countries such as the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Germany and Japan. In 2008, for example, the US showed an 
increase of 16.8% in real terms, which is equivalent to $26 billion USD net ODA. 
While Japan has had falling trends in its net ODA since 2000, the country provided 
$9.4 billion USD in 2008, representing an 8.2% increase from the previous year. Net 
bilateral ODA from DAC to Africa has rapidly grown in the last few years and the 
stability and security in the least developed countries was more widely recognized as 
a top-priority issue in international development.
As many academics believe, poverty and crime and terrorism are closely connected to 
one another and the less stable and needy a country is, the more vulnerable it is to 
exploitation by organized crime and terrorism. In addition, contagious diseases such 
as an avian flu and AIDS are widely and rapidly spread in a country where sanitary 
conditions are lacking. The early prevention of contagion consequently will stop the 
worldwide spread of the disease. Meanwhile, industrial and economic development 
through a road and airport construction in a recipient country can bring prosperity and
4 OECD. Stat Extract. http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode:=REF TOTALODA
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profit a donor country and, in many cases, involvement in ODA strengthens a donor- 
recipient diplomatic, defense and commercial relations. World poverty reduction and 
improvement of sanitation conditions therefore is linked to peace and stability to the 
world. Greater in ODA contributions and more effective foreign aid programs can 
consequently bring a high return to economically developed countries. This is one of 
the reasons why the biggest donor country, the US, has provided a huge amount of 
foreign aid to pro-American countries in Central Asia and the Middle East since 
September 11 in 2001. This also should be one of the primary motivations for Japan’s 
greater participation in the ODA program.
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Chapter 2: Development in Indonesia
The previous chapter outlined the importance of analyzing the economic effects of 
ODA in recipient countries. In order to fully explain this topic, this chapter examines 
the development needs of Indonesia and the history of its relationship with foreign aid. 
The intention is to explain the conditions which lead Indonesia to accept foreign aid 
from multiple sources and the challenges all aid agencies face in Indonesia in 
ensuring the aid provided is effective. This chapter will then be followed by an outline 
of Japanese development assistance in order to fully explain the impact of Japan’s 
ODA in Indonesia.
Indonesia’s Natural Vulnerability
In recent times, Indonesia has suffered from numerous natural hazards including the 
2004 Indian Ocean earthquake, the 2005 Nias earthquake and the 2006 Java 
earthquake. In the decade between 1999 and 2008, the causalities of natural disasters 
in Indonesia totalled 180,000 killed and 8.4 million wounded with a damage bill of 
$10 billion USD. Natural disasters have had a destructive influence not only on the 
survivors and victims but also on later generations in Indonesia. In an interview with 
Antara News, Freddy Numberi, the Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, said 
that because of the recent natural disasters and environmental destruction in Indonesia,
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20 islands vanished from the face of the earth and scientists estimate that not less than 
2,000 islands will disappear by 2030 unless the government devises a solution.5
In addition to frequent natural hazards, Indonesia experienced a major financial crisis 
in 1997-98 and remains many hurdles towards economic development, political 
recovery and the firm establishment of democracy. Notwithstanding that Indonesia is 
a lower middle-income country where Gross National Income (GNI) per capita is 
between $936 and $3,7056 78, poverty remains a significant issue. The most recent 
poverty survey conducted by OECD in 2007 shows that nearly 6.7% of the Indonesian 
population lived below the one-dollar-per-day poverty line; 45.2% lived below the
n
two-dollar-per-day level. Some economists point out that foreign aid is still vital to 
Indonesian economic development. According to OECD’s Aid at a Glance data, 
members of OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) provided 
Indonesia with ODA of a total net value of $2.48 Billion USD during a period
o
between 2003 and 2005. Compared with a total ODA given to other lower-middle 
income countries in Asia such as China ($1.8 billion USD) and Thailand ($1 billion 
USD), Indonesia remains a large recipient despite its current steady economic growth.
5 Antara. Nov.30.20007. http://www.antara.co.id/en/
6 The World Bank World Bank, Data& Statistics.
http://web.worldbank.Org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATlSTlCS/0.xontentMDK:20420458~men 
uPK:64133156~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419.00.html
7OECD (2008) Survey on Monitoring The Paris Deceleration: Making and More Effective by 2010, pp 
22.1-22.16
8 Swivel Major Recipients by region o f total gross bilateral ODA from DAC countries. 
http://www.swivel.com/data sets/show/1005180
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Indonesia’s Developmental Issues
Since Indonesia gained its independence from the Netherlands in 1949, the country 
has been faced with an unstable political and economic situation through the Asian 
financial crisis, East Timor’s secession from Indonesia, armed separatist movements 
in Aceh and West Papua, corruption, terrorist attacks and natural hazards. Meanwhile, 
this country has decentralized authority, strengthened a regional autonomy program, 
advanced the road to democracy and, in 2004, held the first direct presidential 
elections. Compared with most of its neighboring countries in Southeast Asia, this is a 
considerable achievement. In addition, Indonesia is under the way to accomplish 
many of the MDGs by 2015. Indonesia’s first MDGs report and National Human 
Development Report (NHDR) show positive socio-economic progress toward the 
MDGs particularly on adult literacy, infant mortality rate and child under nutrition.
However, other serious concerns remain in Indonesia’s current development. Firstly, 
the progress is slow for the empowerment of women, which is partly attributed to 
Indonesia’s culture and society that is still paternalistic and patrimonial. Supportably, 
the percentage of female rose from 0% only to 11% in the election of 2009. Indonesia 
has also struggled with the low percentage of the population with access to 
improvement sanitation, high maternal fatality rate and acceleration of HIV/AIDs 
epidemic. Besides, the country repeats political trial and error in terms of law 
enforcement and local institutions in many areas need to develop the capacity to 
operate their new mandate sufficiently. After all, even though the MDG targets are
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achieved nationally; these targets can be failed regionally, particularly in the remote 
provinces and districts.9
According to Paul Collier, there are four traps which results in countries remaining 
poor; conflict; natural resources; geography; and bad governance. To be precise, low 
income, slow growth countries are likely to repeat civil war, to depend heavily on its 
natural resources and undermine accountability accelerating economic development 
and to be resource-scare and land-locked. Collier also points out while foreign aid 
helps a developing country to take off from the state of poor governance, it does not 
necessarily work on some fields including geography and natural resources. 10 This 
applied mostly to Africa and Asia.
There are arguments for and against Collier’s four poverty traps as development and 
poverty is far more complicated than these four factors and in many cases, external 
factors greatly affect the country’s policy such as trade. However, what makes 
Indonesia’s development sustainable, if considered from Collier’s perspective, seems 
to depend on its strong governance and institutions that can manage the abundant 
resources and use foreign aid properly. The reason is because Indonesia is an 
archipelago with rich natural resources and a major marine transport in Southeast 
Asia. This enables Indonesia to engage in foreign trade and obtain foreign exchange. 
Notwithstanding, without the effective institutions, Indonesia can not transform these
9 UNDP Country Programme for Indonesia (2006-2010) 
http://www.undp.or.id/pubs/docs/CPD%202006-2010.pdf
10 Paul Collier (2007). The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be 
Done About It. Pp 19-37. Oxford University Press.
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rich recourses and geographical advantage into positive developmental outcomes nor 
make the most of financial recourses for development provided by a donor country.
In addition, Indonesia, like many other developing countries, has faced internal 
conflicts, including those with East Timor, West Papua and Aceh. This instability, 
which is caused by political, religious and resource factors, has undermines its 
development. For instance, if one adopts Collier’s theory, 30 years of conflict with 
Aceh province is attributed to Aceh’s natural resources. That is, while these abundant 
natural resources were worth millions of USD at that time, only 5 % of the huge 
income generated by Aceh’s resource remained in the regions and the rest benefited 
the business elites in Jakarta.
Adopting Collier analysis, there appears to be a correlation between natural resources 
and conflicts. However, these conflicts caused by natural resources can be possibly 
prevented by the functional institutions with a strong resource management and 
eradication of corruption. As Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
stated, “the fight against corruption is a top priority for Indonesia’s government.”11 
Thus the strong institutions correspondingly should be the first concern.
11 BBC News. May 31.2005. http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4583557.stm
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As the World Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy explains, “Indonesia is not 
constrained by a lack of financial resources but by a lack of effective procedures and 
accountability in its institutions.” 12 Also, considering the fact that Indonesia is a 
country subject to numerous natural disasters, it is required to have the reliable 
institutions with the capacity to deal with disaster emergency and to achieve rapid 
reconstruction. According to Gerald Meier, what will decide whether a country will 
achieve sustained long-term growth is the institution that grants dependable property 
rights, handles conflict, maintains laws and order and draws a line between financial 
inducement and social costs and returns. A famous academic study by Burnside and 
Dollar also analysed the interaction between foreign aid and sound policy and it 
concluded good governance and firm policy are significant determinants of aid 
effectiveness.
Effective institutions know how to take available resources and turn them into better 
development outcomes. The effective institutions know how to spend budgets more 
wisely and build better schools, better health clinics, and better livelihoods. Therefore 
the key to make Indonesia’s sustainable development feasible may be whether this 
country implements the policies and foreign aid effectively. 14
12 The World Bank Country Partnership Strategy (2009 - 2012): Investing in Indonesia's Institutions 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/CQUNTRlES/EASTASIAPACIPlCEXT/INDONESI 
AEXTN/0..menuPK:287084~pagePK: 141132~piPK: 141105~theSitePK:226309.00.html
13 Gerald Meier (1984) Leading Issues in Economic Development. PI 10. Oxford University Press.
USA
14 The World Bank Country Partnership Strategy (2009 - 2012): Investing in Indonesia's Institutions 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/lNDONESI 
AEXTN/0..menuPK:287084~pagePK: 141132~piPK:141105~theSitePK:226309.00.html
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Indonesia’s Need for Foreign Aid
Japanese aid to Indonesia takes place in a wider context. From the previous 
subsections, it is clear that despite natural resources, due to geography and economic 
shocks there are times where Indonesia’s need for international aid is great. This sub­
section outlines how many countries, including Japan, attempt to meet this need. 
While ostensibly attempting to meet the development needs of Indonesia, it is 
questionable whether foreign aid has been used effectively for Indonesia’s 
development. It is also questionable whether it has contributed to a reduction of 
poverty and improvement of living standards at grassroots level. This section outlines 
the role ODA has played in Indonesia.
The top three donors for 2005-06 were Japan, the World Bank and Australia; Japan 
accounted for 54.4% of the total ODA and Australia amounted to 8.2%.15 Using 
C. Hill’s remark, although the importance of aid has gradually decreased since 1988, 
Indonesia has not yet accomplished one of its main fiscal objectives, which is reduced 
dependency on foreign aid.16 From the 1970s through to the present, aid has been 
mainly allocated to Indonesia’s economic development and this was seen particularly 
during the periods of economic crisis. For instance, the average contribution of aid to
15 Ministry o f Foreign Affairs o f Japan (MOFA)
file:///Volumes/NO%20NAME/Japanese%20Govenment%20Proiect%20with%20to%201ndonesia/MQ 
FA%20Japan's%200DA%20Data%20bv%20Conntrv%20-%20East%20 Asia.htm
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Indonesia’s development budget was around 28% during 1971-85, it amounted to 
48% during 1986-96 and rose to 67% since the economic crisis.17
The reason why a developing country tends to depend heavily on foreign aid is 
because, according to C. Anis and S. Iman, an availability of ODA support for the 
national budget inspires “a lazy fiscal regime of the government”. This is not an 
exception in Indonesia’s case. In other words, Indonesia’s net aid inflows reflects the 
government's budget shortfall and while increased aid programs and projects induces 
a rise in routine spending, it declines in non-oil tax income. This is due to 
Indonesia’s source of natural resources which the government looks to aid in order to 
finance development expenditure that should be primarily used to support routine 
expenditure. In addition, the fact that aid has a negative impact on non-oil tax revenue 
demonstrates that the government puts less effort to revenue tax collection because 
donors are likely to fill the gap between government revenue and expenditure. 
Accordingly, the increase in routine expenditure indicates that aid project is fungible 
and therefore Indonesia’s dependency on aid can make the country developmental 
unstable and economically less self reliant.19
16 Chapel. Hill. (1996) Macroeconomic Evaluation o f Programme Aid: A Conceptual Framework. IDS 
Bulletin 27, no. 4 (1996): ppl5-24.p46
17 Yukiko. Kuramoto (2004) Ideas and Institutions: Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy 
(http://www.allacademic.eom//meta/p mla apa research citation/0/8/4/3/l/pages84310/p84310-7,php)
18 Anis Chowdhury, Iman Sugema (2005) How significant and effective has foreign-aid to Indonesia 
been? ASEAN Economic Bulletin,
http://flndartides.eom/p/articles/mi_hb020/is_2_22/ai_n29209522/pg_l 0/7tag=content;coll
19 Anis Chowdhury, Iman Sugema (2005) How significant and effective has foreign-aid to Indonesia 
been? ASEAN Economic Bulletin,
http://findarticles.eom/p/articles/mi_hb020/is_2 22/ai_n29209522/pg_l 0/?tag=content;col 1
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Moreover, Indonesia has also raised a crippling debt, which amounted to $90 billion 
USD in 1994. Indonesia’s foreign debts have further swelled from 1275 trillion 
Indonesia Rupiah (Rp) in 2004 to 1,667 Rp in 2009 while their debt ratio against 
Indonesia’s gross domestic product (GDP) had dropped from 57% to 32%. According 
to Fadhil Hasan, an economist of the Institute for Development and Finance (INDEF), 
the reason why Indonesia’s external debt has increased is because the government has 
been allowing a growing aid flow particularly loan offers without actually needing 
it. Besides, as Japan is one of the largest donor countries in Indonesia and a supplier 
of yen loans to the country, when the yen continues to rise against declined US dollars, 
Indonesia’s government inevitably suffers from greater burden on an enormous yen 
inflow. This is because, according to The Economist, Japanese yen accounts for much 
of Indonesia’s foreign debts but most of Indonesia’s export earnings and foreign 
reserves are held in US dollars. Thus when the value of yen increases by 1% against 
the US dollar, it adds $300 million USD or more to Indonesia’s foreign debt.21 
Indonesia has obtained a loan from several creditors such as Japan, the World Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Indonesia’s stand-by loans up to 2009 has 
reached $5.5 billion USD, i.e. $2 billion USD came from the World Bank, $1.5 billion 
USD from Japan, $1 billion USD from Australia and $1 billion USD from the ADB.22
Assuming Indonesia remains largely dependent on foreign aid even after it graduated 
LDC and accomplished modest economic growth, it is ironic that the country owes 
debts to creditors and thousands of ordinary people are still brought up in poverty.
20 Antara. June 17. 2009.
http://www.antara.co.id/en/news/! 245207461 /news-focus-indonesias-debt-ratio-declining
21 The Economist. March 25 1995.
22 Antara. June 17, 2009.
http://www.antara.co.id/en/news/1245207461/news-focus-indonesias-debt-ratio-declining
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The question arisen here is whether foreign aid has been used effectively for 
Indonesia’s regional development and has contributed to a reduction of poverty and 
improvement of living standard at a community level. If so, how effective has foreign 
aid been to Indonesia’s grassroots development. Also, it is of great importance to 
further examine how Indonesia can reduce poverty and achieve social and economic 
development at a regional level through foreign aid. Identifying the current problems 
and re-examining the state of foreign aid is a vital step toward further achievement of 
Indonesian sustainable development.
Aid Projects and Programs in Indonesia
Indonesia’s large population, abundant natural recourses and strategic location along 
major shipping lanes through Southeast Asia make its peace and stability essential to 
many developed countries. This acknowledgement of Indonesia’s importance to 
overall regional stability makes it one of the main recipients of foreign aid in Asian 
countries. As a result development organisations continuously carry out various kinds 
of aid projects and programs. The major sectors that donors focus on are education 
and health. Most of the big donors also consider disaster mitigation, effective 
institution as well as sustainable development in Indonesia as priority areas.
For instance, the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) has 
given priority to helping Indonesia to strengthen its democratic institutions, mitigate 
poverty and accomplish sustainable development. Development projects run by
20
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AusAID in recent years include support for 2004 Indonesian election ($15 million 
AUD), Australian development Scholarships (annual $35 million AUD), 2002-2007 
Indonesia HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care Project Phase II (IHPCP) ($34 million 
AUD), Humanitarian and emergency assistance ($145 million AUD) and 2002-2006
'y'xCommunity Development Scheme ($20 million AUD). Similarly, United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) aims primarily to improve human development to 
fulfil the MDGs, encourage sustainable environment management including effective 
use of natural resources, strengthen local governance, reduce vulnerability to crisis 
and support rehabilitation and recontraction in target areas; Aceh and North 
Sumatra.24
Japan in contrast has focused heavily on the improvement of infrastructure and post 
natural disaster rehabilitation in Indonesia. In 2006, for example, Japan supported 
Regional Infrastructure for Social and Economic Development project (235 million 
JPY), Peusangan Hydroelectric Power Plant Construction Project (260 million JPY), 
The Project for Water Supply in Gunungkidul Regency of Yogyakarta Special 
Territory (5.25 million JPY) and the Project for Reconstruction for the Area Affected 
by Earthquake in Yogyakarta and Central Java (8.90 million JPY). Japan also expends 
its efforts on technical cooperation projects mostly in the education sector, which
23 Australian Agency for International Development.
http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countrv/cbrief.cfrn?DCon:=3010 2150 4972 2067 3443&CountrvId:=30
24 UNDP Country Programme for Indonesia (2006-2010) 
http://www.undp.or.id/pubs/docs/CPD%202006-2010.pdf
21
Sub-thesis U4432391 KanaOhori
includes a Higher Education Development Support Project in Indonesia and the 
Project for National Vocational Rehabilitation Centre for Disabled People.25
According to the World Bank (WB) 2009-2012 New Partnership Strategy (CPS) 
Supports Indonesia ’s Development Priority, the WB is working in broadly six major 
areas; strengthening intuition; developing private sector; improving infrastructure; 
supporting community development and social protection; promoting education; and 
encouraging environmental sustainability and mitigating disaster.26 The WB 
particularly put a great emphasis on building effective institutions, because Indonesia 
is not limited by insufficient financial recourses, rather it is limited by “a lack of 
effective procedures and accountabilities] in its institution^]”. According to Joachim 
von Arnsberg, Indonesia Country Director for the WB, the effective institutions 
consequently result in improving livelihoods for the people because it can turn budget 
expenditure into positive development outcomes such as better schools and better 
health clinics.27
Some previous research conducted by Papanek (1972), Singh (1985), Burnside and 
Dollar (1997) and the WB (1998) also found that a positive correlation between aid 
and growth in a recipient country that has the good-policy environment, which has 
important policy implications for donors community, multilateral aid agencies and
25 Japan’s ODA Date by Country, http://www.mofa.go.ip/policy/oda/data/01 ap eaO 1 .html
26 The World Bank. New Country Partnership Strategy Supports Indonesia’s Development Priorities. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRlES/EASTASlAPACIFlCEXT/INDONESl 
AEXTN/0..contentMDK:21897767~menuPK:224605~DagePK:2865066~DiPK:2865079~theSitePK:22 
6309.00.html
27 The World Bank. Country Partnership Strategy (2009-2012)
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRlES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/lNDONESl 
AEXTN/0,.menuPK:287084~pagePK: 141132~piPK: 141105~theSitePK:226309.00.html
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policymakers. For example, developing countries with coherent policies and high- 
quality public institutions have grown at 2.7% per capita GDP while those without 
them at 0.5% per capita GDP respectively. 1% of GDP in foreign aid normally 
translates to a sustained increase in growth of 0.5% per capita. Some countries with 
sound policies received only small amount of foreign aid yet still achieved 2.2% per 
capita growth. Good-management, high-aid groups grew much faster, at 3.7% per 
capita GDP . Therefore it is vital for Indonesia’s further development to enhance 
institutional capacity that can maximize the effectiveness of its recourses and funds, 
including foreign aid, which is committed to development.
The Importance of Institutions
Indonesia’s challenges in absorbing foreign development and converting this into 
tangible benefits for its population require institutions to be strengthened. Strong 
institutions are an important key to making the foreign aid effective. In economic 
terms, the words institutions are used separately from organisations, and Norman 
Uphoff clarifies what varies between these two. According to Uphoff, institutions, 
whether organisations or not, are complexes of norms and formal or informal rules 
that continue over time and constrain individual behaviour, while organisation,
28 The World Bank (1998). Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t and Why. Oxford University 
Press, New York
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29whether institutions or not, are structural actors of recognised and accepted roles. 
Effective institutions manage all the legal requirements placed upon these structures 
and consist of elements such as political commitment, clear policy frameworks, 
sufficient analytical capacity and effective cross-governmental policy coordination 
and meditation mechanisms.30
The importance of good institutions is also discussed in Lukita D. Tuwo’s Indonesia 
Road Map for Aid Effectiveness and he further examines how ODA can contribute to 
Indonesia’s aid effectiveness. That is, it is when the following three conditions are 
fulfilled that Indonesia can achieve further development; sound programs; instruments 
such as budget and procurement; and recourses including fund and human capital. 
Firstly, a donor country needs to establish a firm foreign aid system and provide 
sound programs or projects to a recipient country. The recipient then receives these 
programs and transforms them into better outcomes for development. In doing so, 
however, it is required to have strong institutions that can deal effectively with the 
flow of aid in order to maximize its impact. According to Tuwo, this can be 
accomplished by enabling Indonesia to access international knowledge, to have the 
global standard of practice and to expand partnerships with other foreign countries.
29 Norman Uphoff. (1996) Indigenous organizations and development. IT studies in knowledge and 
development Higher Education Policy Series. P614
30 OECD (2005) Policy coherence for development: promoting institutional good practice. P43 
OECD Publishing
Jl Lukita, Tuwo. Indonesia Road Map for Aid Effectiveness. 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/19439169/Indonesia-Aid-Effectiveness
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Participatory Development
A companion to strong institutions is participatory development. The WB highlights 
the importance of good governance in the following four areas to increase GNI and to 
bring benefits to the local people in a recipient country through ODA: the rule of law, 
the transparency of aid, accountability and participation of the local people in 
development. Similarly, C. Anis and S. Iman put great emphasis on community 
development in the further achievement of Indonesia. According to Anis and Iman, it 
can be the decisive factor in development for Indonesia to have ownership of aid 
policies and for donor countries to encourage Indonesia to achieve community driven 
development. That is, there is the notion that development is prone to be more 
beneficial to primary stake holders and that “development interventions based on 
local knowledge and experience are more likely to be relevant home-grown and 
therefore sustainable.” This idea seems to conflict with Tuwo’s argument about the 
importance of acquiring international knowledge. That said, applying local knowledge 
to achieve sustainable development and gaining global knowledge to strengthen 
institutions could be different stages of the same process.
From an economic development perspective, there are two major approaches in which 
Indonesia promotes its participatory development. The first approach is community 
driven development and this is fulfilled by the greater involvement in global market at 
community level. To be specific, if the local people are more linked to a global 
network of markets and their products increase in value due to international demand,
32 Kothari, Uma (2001) Power, Knowledge and Social Control in Participatory Development. P 139
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this accelerates a self-supporting economy at an international level. This means 
people are required to bring their local value into accordance with the international 
standards. The second perspective is that the local government’s authority is valued in 
terms of resource management and the local people are to practice market 
segmentation and have autonomy in resource management. That is, it is important to 
find a way to achieve devolution and to invest social capital and commons
• t TTdomestically.
According to Teiichi Aoyama, there are five levels of citizen participation in 
community driven development:
1) manipulation by biased information which does not allow citizens to 
participate development projects at any level;
2) information dissemination or release from the government sector with a low 
level of local participation;
3) consultation toward citizens where local citizens partly participate in a 
project planning;
4) active and voluntary participation and partnership for policy making, policy 
planning in the decision making processes; and
Yoshiaki Nishikawa, Eiichi Yoshida (2009) Chiiki no Shinkou: Seido-kouchiku no Tayousei to Kadai. 
P7. the Institute o f Developing Economics, JETRO. Chiba
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5) citizen control stage where the local people are in charge of policy making, 
planning and development processes.34
Some projects in Indonesia, if measured against the yardstick of Aoyama’s citizen 
participation level, have been successful in terms of community driven development. 
In other words, some districts and regions in Indonesia have encouraged active 
participation of citizen and achieved a good partnership with stakeholders and agents 
when decentralization was promoted. While other projects including those at the 
Asahan and Koto Panjang regions discussed below have failed partly because these 
projects are the ones imposed by a donor and, in many cases, they do not reflect the 
recipient’s needs nor meet their demands.
However, it is too dangerous to make sweeping generalizations about the importance
of leaving decision-making for development to local governments. This is because the
local governments in many districts and regions, particularly remote areas, often lack
the capacity to implement legal and other mandates, establish effective policy
frameworks and co-ordination, manage their own resources and arbitrate among each
district. Therefore it is difficult for them to maximize their resources and make
efficient use of aid provided from donor countries. Moreover, assuming the local
government is empowered, the absence of appropriate accountability and transparency
mechanisms often result in the concentration of power in the hands of the local elite
and increases in nepotism. In Indonesia, with the vast geographic spread of local
administrative centers, it is likely that there are high degrees of corruption. This is
because the geography of Indonesia acts as impediments to effective communication.
34 Teiichi Aoyama (2000) Environmental Impact Assessment System for Democratic Decision Making. 
JBIC Symposium. 3. Dec. 2000. http://www.gef.or.jp/jbic/minutes/HQ5-5.pdf
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The overheads associated with local administration between different population 
centers in an island archipelago provide opportunities for local administrators to take 
advantage of this vulnerability. When foreign aid is included in the context of weak 
control measures, this opportunity for abuse increases.
Thus, external intervention by means of foreign aid, ODA and technical assistance 
can be highly valuable, if it is done right. A donor country is expected to provide 
projects and programs based on the spirit of local self-help and to encourage further 
involvement of the people in development. Nevertheless, it is consistent that donor 
countries plan and carry out the projects and programs with the donor as a central 
figure, which encourages the people to participate actively in Indonesia’s 
development while local and national institutions are developed. This oversight, 
balanced by meaningful local involvement mitigates against corruption.
Future Prospects for Indonesia’s Development
Some academics point out that overabundant foreign aid, especially aid in the form of 
loans, can saddle heavy debts on Indonesia. This then requires Indonesia to reduce 
dependency on foreign aid. However, it is also true that Indonesia still needs foreign 
aid mostly to strengthen its institutions and to improve priority sectors of education, 
sanitation and the empowerment of females.
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While there is a tendency among major donor countries to strongly emphasize the 
importance of effective institutions for Indonesia’s further development, Japan’s ODA 
projects do not necessarily meet Indonesia’s demand.
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Chapter 3: Japan’s Official Development Assistance
The previous chapter outlined the development needs of Indonesia and its experience 
with the presence of foreign development assistance. In receiving this assistance, 
there are different motives at play within Indonesia. Similarly, this chapter will 
outline the motives behind Japan’s ODA program with Indonesia. It focuses on the 
development of Japanese ODA policy and the interests Japan has in advancing its 
development agenda abroad. It then outlines current trends in Japanese ODA, and 
general critiques on the Japanese approach to international development. An outline 
of Japanese ODA is important as it provides the context where this development 
assistance has been provided to Indonesia, which itself is discussed at Chapter 4.
History of Japan’s ODA
Indonesia is one of many countries that receive Japanese ODA. This assistance has 
been provided to Indonesia for decades reflecting Japan’s enduring interests in the 
Southeast Asia region. The development of a policy that has resulted in Indonesia 
being provided with billions of dollars worth of ODA started from Japan’s emergence 
from World War Two. Through its recovery, it realized a need to invest economically 
in the future of its region.
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In 1954, Japan commenced its ODA program by taking part in the Colombo Plan to 
assist South East Asian economic and social development. The Colombo Plan, 
conceived at the Commonwealth Conference on Foreign Affairs in 1951, was to 
provide collective technical and financial assistance, primarily focused on human 
resources development to members of British Commonwealth countries. At the same 
time, Japan began war reparations payments to Burma under the Japan-Burma Peace 
Treaty and the agreement on Reparations and Economic Cooperation. Then it 
successively concluded reparations treaties with the Philippines, the Republic of 
Vietnam and Indonesia. In 1958, Japan began to provide a yen loan to India, aiming to 
lend and invest in developing countries in order to promote economic cooperation. 16 
of 21 loan agreements that Japan made between 1975 and 1964 were for India and 
Pakistan. These loans were provided from the Export-Import Bank of Japan and had 
interest rate of 5.75-6.0% which was not qualified as ODA within the present 
definition.35 In 1964, Japan joined OECD and pledged its dedication to achieving the 
fundamental aims; international economic growth; development in the third world and 
expansion of the world trade.
Approximately seven years later, Japan decided to integrate economic foreign 
cooperation into its regional foreign policy. In 1966, the country had an international 
ministerial conference for East Asian development in Tokyo where it began a full- 
scale foreign aid program to be provided to East Asia. This foreign aid program is the 
foundation of a later ODA program of Japan. However, Japan’s foreign aid expansion 
during this time was aimed to establish a stronger relationship with the US and was
35 Marie Soderberg (1996) The Business of Japanese Foreign Aid- Five case studies from Asia, 
Routledge. London. pp33-34
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used as a political/diplomatic tool to advance the national interest. This was 
demonstrated by a chain reaction that Japan held the international development 
conference, which responded to a policy that then US president, Lyndon Johnson 
advocated in the preceding year and aimed to meet the US demands for Japanese co­
operation.
In 1977, a year after Japan completed its reparations to the Philippines, it established 
the first medium-term target for ODA as a member of a great economic power for the 
purpose of officially giving long running economic support to developing countries. A 
fundamental motive for Japan’s ODA was to serve the national interests, particularly 
to secure natural resources and expand international trade through its ODA, which Jun 
Inada believes is attributed to the oil crisis in the 1970s. In the book the Current State 
o f Economic Cooperation, and Its Outlook: The North-South Problems and 
Development Assistance published in 1978, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
clearly stated that Japan’s ODA and economic cooperation programs were to 
contribute the peace and stability in the world and to strengthen a friendly 
relationships with developing countries in order to contribute to Japan’s stable
'Xfseconomic growth. Similarly, in 1980 comprehensive security research group 
(Sougou Anzenhoshou Kenkyu group) issued a statement that Japan’s future 
diplomacy is required to have a capacity to:
1) prevent threats by it own efforts;
36 Ministry of Foreign Affairs o f Japan (MOFA), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/POLICY/oda/summary/l 994/l.html
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2) develop relations with countries that share similar ideologies and a common 
interest for safety’s sake; and
3) work on behalf of world security and stability.
Yoshiaki Tanaka interprets this as Japanese foreign aid and ODA programs to be a 
means of self defense and diplomatic strategies. He asserts that due to Japan’s limited 
self-defense capacity, Japan developed a strategy for the diplomacy and national 
defense by emphasizing its responsibility for the world security and expanding its 
foreign aid and ODA.37
Tanaka also points out that a reason of this dramatic increase in Japan’s foreign aid 
which reached the sum of over $2 million USD in such a short term was because 
Japan was focused on strengthening ties with the US through the perception of 
“burden sharing”. That is, due to economic crisis hit the US in the late 1960s, the US 
was unable to bear a greater load of responsibility in Asia as a donor country and 
expected Japan to take assist with these efforts. The then American leaders 
encouraged Japan and other industrialized states to increase their annual commitment 
of ODA. In order to share this responsibility, Japan had increased both the budget for 
its foreign aid and scale of its recipients which was intended to strengthen the 
Japanese-US relationship and build up its national defense. In this sense, Japan’s 
foreign aid program was used as the price of U.S. military protection and for prior U.S. 
assistance to Japan.38
37 Yoshiaki Tanaka (1995) Enjyo toiu Gaikou Senryaku. Asahi sensho. Tokyo, Japan. Ppl26-144. 
Steven W. Hook (1995) National Interest and Foreign Aid.
38 Yoshiaki Tanaka (1995) Enjyo toiu Gaikou Senryaku. Asahi sensho. Tokyo, Japan. Ppl26-144.
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Since the mid-1980s, Japan has taken a current role as one of the major donor 
countries and implemented various kinds of foreign aid such as transferring 
technologies, providing emergency disaster relief and providing funds to developing 
countries. In the meanwhile, this country finally completed repayment of a loan in the 
1990s that Japan borrowed from the World Bank after its defeat of World War Two. 
Thus, Japan has a unique historical background as a country that transformed itself 
from a recipient country into the top donor country in the world.
Through the second half of the 20th Century, Japan has changed the concepts and 
objectives of its ODA. From research on Japan’s aid policies since 1958, Inada 
analyses that Japan has developed its ODA policies based on the national interest and 
international public interest. Here the priority has shifted from an economic 
orientation to a political orientation. The definition of an economic orientation is 
Japan’s short-term and long-term economic interests which ensure security of natural 
recourses and the strengthening of economic relations with developing countries. 
Meanwhile political orientation is defined as Japan’s responsibility as an advanced 
country to improve the political stability or request or pressure from other developed 
countries. This is seen in Japan’s current position as the chair country for a summit 
and conference of the world leaders such as the Ministerial Conference on the 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia in 1992, International Conference on 
African Development (TIC AD) in 1993 (TICAD 1), 1998 (TICAD 2) and 2003 
(TIC AD 3) and the Ministerial Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to 
Afghanistan in 2002.
Steven W. Hook (1995) National Interest and Foreign Aid. P74 
39 Jun Inada. (1990) Japan’s Official Development Assistance to ASEAN Countries: Its Objectives and 
Policy Making Process, in “Development and ODA”. The United Nations University. Tokyo.
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In 1992, the Japanese government adopted the ODA Charter that is the first 
comprehensive official policy for Japan’s development aid. The ODA Charter 
includes “humanitarian considerations”, “recognition of interdependence among 
nations of the international community”, “environmental consideration” and “support 
for self-help efforts of recipient countries” as a basic philosophy of Japan’s ODA. 
Above all, the importance of self-help is emphasized in Japan’s foreign aid. However, 
while Japan has pronounced its philosophies and motivations on various occasions 
over time, Japan’s current ODA policy shares similarities with the origin of its 
reparation system. According to Yukiko Kuramoto, Japan has used Japanese currency 
for grants and concessional loans since 1960s, invested in human capital in mainly 
Asian countries and focused on economic infrastructure projects to help Asia’s 
economic development.40 Additionally, Japan’s ODA is still based on an “aid-by­
request” policy that was adopted during the reparation period. This is a system that 
recipient governments are required to submit official requests to Japanese government 
through diplomatic channels for each project and program, which is meanwhile due to 
Japan’s existing ODA policy focused on a concept of self-help. Furthermore, although 
Japan’s foreign policies were greatly affected by the West particularly the US during 
Cold War, Japan has pursued its own economic development policies for ODA.41 This 
is party attributed to Japanese own experience as a donor recipient country, following 
its defeat in World War Two, subsequent high economic growth and partly because of 
an evolving post-war national interest. In short, behind Japan’s hitherto policy making 
on its foreign aid and ODA, there appears to be the sense that Japan’s ODA has been 
used as a means of advancing diplomatic and security interests.
40 Yukiko Kuramoto.(2004) Ideas and Institutions: Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy 
http://www.allacademic.eom//meta/p mla apa research citation/0/8/4/3/l/pages84310/p84310-7.php
41 Yukiko Kuramoto. Ideas and Institutions: Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy.
http://www.allacademic.eom//meta/p mla apa research citation/0/8/4/3/l/pages84310/p84310-7.php
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While Japan’s ODA has been often viewed as measures to secure its natural resources 
and promote the national interest among the countries of the OECD's DAC, Japan has 
changed its aid and development policy with the times. Since 1997 when Japan 
became the world biggest donor country, it has decreased the scale for its ODA to 
developing countries by slow degrees under the influence of global economic 
recession. However, the greater expectations for the DAC members to contribute to 
the achievement of the MDGs have been, the stronger degree of commitment the 
other DAC countries was required to be made. In 2008, for example, no less than 
$119.8 billion USD of ODA was provided to developing countries by DAC, which 
was the highest dollar figure ever recorded. While the total amount of Japan’s ODA 
had tended slightly downward since 2000, it provided $9.4 billion USD, which was a 
gain of 8.2% over the previous year. This was partly attributed to a world tendency 
for increasing value of ODA under the statement of MDGs goal 8: developing a 
global partnership for development which includes tariff and quota free access for 
Least Developed Country exports; enhanced programme of debt relief for HIPC and 
cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous ODA for countries 
committed to poverty reduction42.
Since Japan started taking part in the ODA program, the country has provided them 
with ODA to developing countries on the basis of a sense of responsibility and self- 
interest. While Japanese ODA often is exposed to criticism from international 
societies, it is based on Japan’s own experience as a donor recipient and subsequent 
economic high economic growth, which makes the foreign and aid policies very
42 The United Nations,
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/global.shtml
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unique. Then, in this day of economic disparities where international cooperation and 
partnership on development is further emphasized, for what purpose and under what 
policies does Japan provide enormous amount of ODA to recipient countries? While 
UN, international organizations and DAC members join together as one to realize the 
MDGs, has Japan’s ODA contributed to the development of recipient countries?
While in a global recession, how can Japan with limited funds provide more effective 
and quality aid to recipient country hereafter? The following sub-section answers 
these questions by first looking at main features of Japan’s current ODA and criticism. 
It then examines Japanese possibility to improve policies and quality of its ODA 
henceforth so that it can contribute to not only targeted countries economic 
development but also the accomplishment of the MDGs.
Current Trends in Japan’s ODA
While Japan has showed a tendency toward reducing the budget for its ODA since 
1997 due to the 1997-98 economic crisis, the considerable ODA volume increase over 
the previous year was seen in 2008 in Japan. Now Japan is the world 5th largest donor 
country and the close attention from academics and international societies are focused 
on Japan’s contribution to the global development. Japan’s ODA consists of 
multilateral and bilateral assistance, which includes loans, grants and technical 
cooperation. Loan aid is aimed to assist developing countries in their efforts to 
improve economic and social infrastructure with low-interest and long-term loans; 
while grant aid is to give financial assistance to these countries without repayment. 
Technical cooperation is to help developing countries to develop human resources by
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training and providing education to young experts and academics as well as running a 
joint project with the local government, companies and organizations. Although 
Japan’s foreign and aid policies have varied with the change of times and objectives, 
some traditional characteristics of Japanese foreign policies are still in the Japan’s 
current ODA.
One of the dinstinctive features to Japanese ODA is the bureaucratic framework 
within Japan which develops and implements aid policy that involves the Cabinet 
Office and no less than 12 bureaucratic actors. The Economic Planning Agency in the 
Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) are the main 
governmental organs which establish a policy on Japan’s ODA by mutual agreement 
and implement loan aid. The Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
mostly deals with the provision of grant aid and technical assistance. These ministries 
play an important role along each objective and budget and they are placed on an 
equal and independent footing. For example, MOFA holds the authority to decide the 
allocation of Japan’s bilateral aid to each country from a diplomatic position and 
emphasizes a relation with other donor countries, international organizations and 
recipients. On the other hand, MOF not only makes an optimum allocation to Japan’s 
ODA and presents the general outlines of budget but also plays a role under 
International Organizations such as the WB and ADB. METI has been traditionally
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concerned in Japan’s commercial interest but it has been actively involved in 
technical support and environmental issues through ODA in recent years.43
Although the current structure of Japan’s ODA carries across many ministries and 
agencies, this enables each sector to share information and knowledge as well as 
redress imbalances in a specific views or projects. However it can also bring about a 
dubious flow of funds and misunderstanding among the participants or competition 
over division of authority, budget and profit, which results in Japan’s complex 
mechanism of administration and inefficient performance in its ODA. In addition, due 
to Japan’s ODA policy based on its reparation treaties, Japan has traditionally 
allocated its budget for bilateral ODA mostly to Asian countries and focused on 
Asia’s economic growth. For instance, 62.4% of Japan’s bilateral ODA was allotted 
to Asia while only 11% to Africa in 1998. Up to 2003, the relative importance of Asia 
in Japan’s ODA had been greatly emphasized and during a period between 1998 and 
2003, almost $30 billion USD had been provided to Asian countries.44
However, Japan’s bilateral budget for Asian countries dropped to $1 billion USD in 
2007, which is equivalent to one forth of the 1998’s total bilateral ODA budget to 
Asia. This is partly a result of the reduction of Japan’s ODA due to the world 
economic crisis, but it should be also taken into account that Japan has shifted the 
emphasis on its ODA policy from national interest to international public interest and
43 Bureaucratic Politics Approach to Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) Policy Making: 
Ministrial Motives and Their Relations on the Foreign Aid Policy
http://www.allacademic.eom/meta/p mla_apa_research_citation/0/8/3/0/l/p83019_index.html
44 Ministry o f Foreign Affairs (MOFA). Nikakokukan Seifukaihatsu no Chiikibetsu. Keitaibetsu Haibun 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/hakusyo/08_hakusho_sh/pdfs/s2-3.pdf
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from economic motives to a political motives. That is, along with the trend of ODA 
among the other DAC members and under the MDGs, Japan has changed aid and 
development policies and gradually placed more emphasis on Africa and other 
regions. In 2006, Japan’s bilateral budget to Africa surpassed that of Asia for the first 
time in Japan’s ODA history.
As a third feature of Japan’s ODA, the country tends to have a high ratio of physical 
infrastructure to social infrastructure in its ODA. Japan has placed an importance on 
physical infrastructure such as highways, dams and school construction and supported 
the economic and industrial development of recipient countries. Meanwhile, the 
country has had less weight in social infrastructure and the role it has played in social 
or soft infrastructure in developing countries has been minor compared with the other 
DAC countries. According to MOFA, the largest use of Japan’s bilateral aid has been 
traditionally for economic infrastructure (seisan bumon), which for example 
amounted to nearly 80% of the total in 1987. Although Japan’s bilateral aid had 
gradually shifted from hard infrastructure to soft infrastructure, hard infrastructure 
still amounted for 31.5% of the total and only 19.7% of the total went to social 
infrastructure (shakai bumon) in 1990. Generally, Japan’s bilateral aid has mainly 
consisted of construction projects while education, water supply and sanitation, which 
are predominant in Western ODA, made up only 10% of the total social infrastructure.
Nevertheless, with a revision of Japan’s aid policy, world tendency toward 
emphasizing poverty reduction and the improvement of human basic needs, Japan has 
put greater importance on its social infrastructure. In 2007, the ratio of Japan’s ODA
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budget for social infrastructure was 27%, which was higher than that of economic 
infrastructure (23%) for the first time in its ODA history.4  ^Besides that, Japan’s ODA 
has historically provided tied aid over untied aid and loan aid over grant aid to 
developing countries. The ratio o f tied aid is of which use is restricted to pursue 
services and goods from the donor country and Japan’s tied loan aid has been 
considered as a heavy burden on the recipient country that does not have ability to 
repay and get out of debt. Due to Japan’s political aspirations to promote foreign trade 
since 1972, Japanese government had aimed to export goods and build up a close tie 
with Asian countries through tied aid. However, responding to growing criticism of 
Japan’s ODA system from international communities and academics, Japan’s untied 
aid increased rapidly in the 1980s and by 1986, it had reached 71% of all aid. In 1991, 
the united ratio amounted to 83.3% and 96.4% in 1999, which was the highest 
percentage of untied ratio in 22 DAC countries. In the meanwhile, Japan’s grant aid is 
still low relative to other DAC countries and in 1990, for instance, grant aid accounted 
for only 48.6% of the total.46
While this high rate o f Japan’s loan aid often attracts critiques on the international 
arena, the fundamental cause o f this is resulted from Japan’s revenue source. That is, 
the coffers o f Japan’s ODA come from the general account, investment program and 
national government securities, which restrict Japanese government to provide grant 
aid over loan aid. (q.v. table 1) As Funazu states in his book, because investment
45 Ministry o f foreign Affairs o f Japan. Seifu Kaihatsu Enjyo (ODA) Hakusho 2008 Nen Ban. Nihon no 
Kokusai Kyouryoku
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/hakusyo/08hakusho_pdf/pdfs/08hakusho_04.pdf
46 Seisaku Kousou Forum (The Forum for Policy Innovation). Seifu Kaihatsu Enjyo (ODA) no Kokka
Senryaku wo Tsukure. http://www.skf.gr.ip/no43/no43 4.html
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program including money from portal savings, pensions and other civilian savings are 
repayable to Japanese citizen, they are not to be applied to grant aid, which results in 
Japan’s bilateral ODA largely consisting of yen loan aid. This funding system affects 
quality and quantity of Japan’s ODA and possibly imposes a heavy foreign debt 
burden on recipient countries. Therefore, as a member of international societies, Japan 
will be required to reconsider how to make efficient use of funds for its ODA as well 
as to tap a new source of revenue to improve its grant aid ratio hereafter.47
Tablel 1. The flow of Japanese ODA
Japanese tax -> the general account budget/ O
citizen -> saving in government security -> special account budget D
postal saving/ post office insurance funds m anagem et in the !
A
Ministry of Finance A
Japan typically emphasized economic growth over human social development 
including a rise in villager’s standard of living in developing countries, loan aid over 
grants aid and tied bilateral loans over untied loans. Japan’s donor approach to ODA 
is based on its experience as an aid recipient country after The Second World War and 
the following rapid economic growth by allocating a loan to physical infrastructure.
47 Jun Funazu. (2005) ODA and the globalization o f Public Finance (ODA to Zaisei no Kokusaika) 
Yuuhikaku books. Tokyo
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This approach is, according to the government of Japan, the most efficient way to 
ensure recipient country’s sustainable development and authority of ODA. In other 
wards, it is by giving a secure source of funds, fostering a credit culture, promoting 
private-sector-led economic growth and maintaining stable relations with 
development partners that development is sustainable and the recipient country has 
‘ownership’ of ODA. Nevertheless, on the one hand this process possibly lead to the 
path to economic autonomy in developing countries; on the other hand it is highly 
controversial in the international societies.48 Now that the target date for the MDGs 
passed turnaround and there is a great fear for the miscarriage of the Goals by 2015, it 
is the time for Japan to revise tradition-fixated foreign and aid policies and to run 
audacious and carefully planned projects as opposed to the conventional infrastructure, 
Asia focused approach.
Critiques of Japan’s ODA
In spite of well-publicized efforts to fend off international criticism of Japan’s ODA, 
there is perception remained among the DAC countries that “Japanese ODA has been 
most deeply titled toward reaping selfish benefits”.49 The radical critique is, 
considering the face that the quality of aid among DAC countries is often measured in 
economic terms, not in terms of the success of a project, it is questionable that Japan’s 
ODA is considered as quality aid. If quality is measured by the amount of grant aid as
48 Bill Pritchard. Inside Asia. May 4 2007 
http://insideasia.tvpepad.com/ia/2006/05/oda Japanese wa.html
49 David Arase. (2005) Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Direction. Routledge
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opposed to loan aid and grant element, Japan is placed the lowest rank in both those 
lists.50 As Coppel Orr claims, Japan’s ODA seems to contribute not only to the 
development of recipient country’s economy but also, in some degree, to the 
accumulation of the country’s foreign debt. That is due to the high rate of Japan’s loan 
aid. According to Orr, one of Japan’s major recipient countries, Indonesia’s foreign 
debt was $410 million USD in 1988 and the country owed at least one-third of the 
total foreign debt to Japan.51 Indonesia’s foreign loan from Japan has reached $1.5 
billion USD up to 2009 and it is estimated to keep mounting at this rate. Some 
academics criticizes that Japan’s loan system resembles the US sub-prime loan in a 
way both of them give a large loan to people/countries that are unable to repay and 
plagued b y  debts. If Japan continues to provide a large amount of yen loans to a 
country that does not have the ability to repay, not only the recipient country is 
burdened by debt repayment but also Japan digs itself into a hole.
In addition, in spite of being one of leading donors in absolute terms, Japan gives only 
0.26% of its GNI, which is well below the average of DAC countries and the 4th 
lowest position among 21 DAC members. This is opposed to most of European ODA 
that tends to emphasize the provision of direct grants for the UN goals. For instance, 
the total amount of Japanese ODA $9.4 billion USD or 0.18% of its GNI was 
calculated in 2008 while Sweden contributed $4.7 billion USD or 0.98% of its GNI, 
the 0.88% of ODA/GNI ratio was presented in Norway and 0.34% in Australia.52
50 Marie Soderberg (1996) The Business o f Japanese Foreign Aid- Five case studies from Asia, 
Routledge. London. P37
51 Koppel, R Orr (1993) Japan's Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era, Westview Press
52 OECD. Table 1: Net Official Development Assistance 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/34/42459170.pdf
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Although the country has adopted the UN goal of using 0.7% of GNI for ODA, it is 
still a long and arduous way for Japan to achieve the UN goal without concrete time 
frame decided upon.
The Japanese approach might be successful in addressing the general context for 
economic expansion in developing country; however it is insufficient in directly 
addressing pressing social issues such as poverty reduction, illiteracy and women’s 
rights in a recipient country. Traditionally, Japan has given too much weight to 
physical infrastructure in a recipient country, particularly in Asia, which is opposed to 
most western DAC countries. While net bilateral ODA to the Least Developed 
Countries (LDC) and social development in these courtiers are greatly emphasized 
among the DAC members, Japan has provided its ODA less than other countries to 
the LDCs. Primary reason for the comparatively low proportion of aid to the LDCs is 
the heavy priority Japan gives to diplomatically and commercially important countries 
in Asia which has prospect of further economic growth. Japan is almost the only 
country that continues to provide a large amount of bilateral aid to Asian countries 
such as China, the Philippines and Thailand which already graduated the LDCs.
This is because Japanese objective to promote its national interests is present in the 
ODA policy. Thus, Japan is far behind other DAC countries in terms of its 
contribution to development of the LDCs and achievement of the UN goals.
53 Marie Soderberg (1996) The Business o f Japanese Foreign Aid- Five case studies from Asia, 
Routledge. London. P42
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While global demand for security and stability increases in a contemporary society 
and objectives and quality of foreign aid continue to change, Japan embraces 
positions on its ODA “which has been traditionally associated with Japanese thinking 
on the subject.” 54 That is, Japan’s economic development approach is a product of the 
Japanese unique concept of “sharing prosperity through co-existence (Kyozon- 
Kyoei)”. This means the national interests of Japan and developing countries’ 
accomplishment through Japanese economic development approach are not mutually 
exclusive but compatible. Although foreign aid as a means of responding to its high 
dependency on raw materials was a significant motivator of the then Japanese foreign 
policy, a recipient country, particularly in Asia, could enjoy prosperity brought by 
increased trade and foreign currency.55 This approach was therefore created based on 
a concept of combined effects and mutual interests to both Japan and a recipient 
country.
This idea seems to remain present in current Japanese ODA policy. Supporting this, 
Bill Pritchard states that Japan follows the conventional method in the belief that the 
developmental sustainability requires a stress on long-term investments in economic 
infrastructure; untied loan aid allows recipient countries to select their own priorities; 
and a credit culture may aid in instilling principles of good economic governance at 
the national level.56 In addition, due to the current economic downturn, it is 
understandable that Japan aims to achieve a high return and promote the national
54 Pritchard Bill. (2006) Inside Asia: ODA Japanese Way. 
http://insideasia.typepad.com/ia/2006/05/oda iapanese wa.html
55 Edward Lincoln (1993), Japan’s New Global Role. Washington, DC: the Brookings Institution
56 Pritchard Bill. (2006) Inside Asia: ODA Japanese Way. 
http://insideasia.typepad.com/ia/2006/05/odajapanese_wa.html
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interests by its ODA projects. However, with growing demand for international 
development and Japan’s greater responsibility as an economically advanced country, 
the Japanese traditional approach toward foreign aid may not be able to meet 
international needs and therefore can not be fully effective. The next chapter will 
determine the extent of effectiveness of Japan’s ODA policies in Indonesia.
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Chapter 4: Japan’s Official Development Assistance Projects in 
Indonesia
The preceding chapters have outlined Indonesia’s development needs, its relationship 
with foreign aid, and the development of Japan’s ODA policy. Now that two pieces of 
the puzzle have been examined, this chapter focuses on Japan’s ODA projects in 
Indonesia. Firstly, it introduces it places the Japanese ODA provided to Indonesia in 
the context its overall engagement with Indonesia, it then introduces two Japanese 
ODA projects with the examples of the Asahaii Dam and Koto Panjang Dam. 
Through these case studies it will examines the effectiveness of aid based on the 
governmental and academic evaluations. It then examines the practicality, strengths 
and weaknesses of Japan’s ODA projects in Indonesia. Finally, it discusses how Japan 
can make the most of its ODA to achieve the primary objectives and contribute to the 
recipient country’s further development, using the case study of Japan’s ODA projects 
in Indonesia.
Japanese Engagement with Indonesia
Japanese ODA must be seen in the overall context of its engagement with Indonesia. 
Historically, geographically and commercially, Japan has strengthened close ties with 
Indonesia. Diplomatic relations between Japan and Indonesia were established in 
1958 with the Signing of the Treaty of Peace. Now Japan is one of the largest 
economic partners of Indonesia. In the investment field, Japan has traditionally been
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the largest investor in Indonesia outside the oil sector. Japan’s direct investment to 
Indonesia between 1967 and 1990 accounted for 25% of the total cumulative 
investment approvals, which was equivalent to $9.3 billion USD. Although Japan is 
no longer such a big stakeholder as it was ten years ago, Japan’s role remains 
predominant and during a period between 2002 and 2006, its share in investment in 
Indonesia accounted for $5 billion USD. In addition, Indonesia is a top trade partner 
of Japan and this country mostly exports petroleum, natural gas, oil and a mineral fuel 
to Japan. This accounted for 21% of Indonesia’s annual export in 2007 and the total 
exports of Indonesia to Japan between 2002 and 2007 were valued at $1,050 billion 
USD.
For actual ODA, Indonesia is one of Japan’s largest recipients. Almost over 40 years 
from 1996 to 2005, Japan had provided the cumulative total amount of $46.8 billion 
USD bilateral ODA to Indonesia.^7 Japan has given Indonesia a large amount of 
economic assistance over the past half a century and the country has seemingly made 
a major contribution to Indonesia’s economic development through its ODA. For 
example, Japan provided Indonesia 2.2 trillion Japanese Yen (JPY) out of the total 
11.2 trillion JPY loan in 2002, which was mainly allocated to the economic 
infrastructure and human resource development in Indonesia. In 2007, Indonesia was 
the ninth largest recipient country of Japan’s grant aid and second largest recipient of 
Japanese technical co-operation.
57 Ministry o f Foreign Affairs o f Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/indonesia/index.html
58 Ministry o f Foreign Affairs o f Japan (MOFA) (1997). Japan’s ODA 1997. (Tokyo: Association for 
Promotion o f International Co-operation).ppl88-189
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While Indonesia and Japan has established a close and relaxed relationship, there 
were concerns especially among the older generation about Indonesia’s dependence 
on Japan for its aid, development and investment from time to time. For instance, the 
relationship between two countries was strained in the mid-1970 when anti-Japanese 
sentiment aroused in Jakarta during the visit of the then prime minister, Kakuei 
Tanaka. This incident is known as Malari Riot (Malapetaka Lima Belas Januari) and 
is believed to be caused by the local disagreement against the then prime minister, 
Soeharto’s administration, poor economic condition and foreign influence including 
increasing foreign investment in the country. In the interview with Jakarta News, 
Hariman Siregar, one of the key student leaders in the Malari Riot states that the main 
objective of the riot was to express their growing dissatisfaction at Soeharto’s 
government and his regime including the spread of corruption and maldistribution of 
power and wealth. In addition, the rising foreign investment was considered as a 
factor that increased the local unemployment and worsened the economic condition in 
Indonesia and therefore Japan, the Indonesia’s largest foreign investor of those times, 
was targeted by those who opposed to foreign investment.59
To this very day there are still reservations concerning Indonesia’s reliance on 
Japanese aid for its development. However, the relationship between Indonesia and 
Japan is stable and strong. This is because Indonesia still remains the focus of Japan’s 
ODA in spite of its complex historical background as well as some criticism of 
Japanese aid within and outside the country. Indonesia is a reliable suppler to Japan of 
natural resources with major shipping lines through the Straits of Malacca and 
Lombok. This issue of national security and diplomacy, including a strong trade and 
59 Jakarta News (Jakarta Shinburi). http://www.jakartashimbun.com/. Stated on 24. January. 2003
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investment ties, results in Japan’s aid contribution to Indonesia.60 According to 
MOFA, the Japanese government cites several reasons for attaching great weight to a 
bilateral aid to Indonesia over many other countries. That is; 1) Indonesia is a 
politically and economically important country to Japan and those countries have a 
strong historical relation with each other; 2) Indonesia occupies a major line of marine 
transportation for Japan; 3) Indonesia is Japanese main trade partner; and 4) Jakarta 
enjoys a prominent position within the international community.... therefore taking 
into consideration all the above, Indonesia needs large amounts of aid.61
As previous research on Japan’s ODA indicates, it seems obvious that there are 
underlying motives for Japan’s ODA behind its contribution to the achievement of the 
MDGs and recipient country’s further development. Marie Soderberg, for instance, 
concludes in her book The Business o f Japanese Foreign Aid that a donor-recipient 
relation is not only one-sided but rather give and take and therefore mutual. This is 
clearly seen in Japan and recipient’s relationships considering Japan’s choice of 
country, type of foreign aid and its aid policy and method.62 Foreign aid accordingly 
is to be beneficial to both a donor and recipient. The similar arguments are developed 
in David Arase’s Buying Power: The Political Economy o f Japan ’s Foreign Aid 
(1995). Assuming this is true, a main concern of Japan seems whether the country will 
not only have a high return through its great involvement in ODA projects but also 
help a recipient country to achieve further development.
60 Hal Hill. (2000) The Indonesian Economy. pp92-93. Cambridge University Press.
61 Ministry o f Foreign Affairs o f Japan (MOFA). (1997) Japan’s ODA 1997. Tokyo: Association for 
Promotion o f International Co-operation, pp 188-189
62 Marie Soderberg (1996) The Business o f Japanese Foreign Aid- Five case studies from Asia, 
Routledge. London. Pp277-289
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Then, how effective and successful has Japanese ODA been to improve its domestic 
situation in economically, diplomatically and in terms of security? In addition to its 
own national interest, has Japanese ODA contributed to recipient country’s 
development and prosperity? And how can Japan make its ODA more effective and 
qualitative within a limited budget and source hereafter?
Case Studies: Japanese ODA Assistance to the Ashan and Koto Paniang Dams
Japanese ODA was provided to Indonesia to assist with the construction of the Ashan 
and Koto Panjang Dams. This aid was provided on the basis that there was an 
increasing demand for electricity in Indonesia as the power sector has grown 
dramatically in Indonesia since 1970. While construction of power was necessary to 
increase Indonesian standards of living, it is also of high cost and therefore not out of 
reach unless foreign assistance was provided. A large portion of foreign aid was 
therefore allocated to the power sector in Indonesia, which currently amounts for a 
quarter of all Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) to the country.
Persahaan Listrik Negara (PLN), Indonesia’s state electricity company, has played a 
dominant role to implement power projects and, while power demand increased, PLN 
achieved an average of 15.5% annual growth between 1970 and 1991. PLN comes 
under the Ministry of Mines and Energy and takes charge of construction and 
operation of all publicity owned power plants as well as sale of electric power to the 
end-users. Japan is one of major countries that provide a large amount of ODA to 
Indonesia’s infrastructure sector such as electricity supply, dams and 
telecommunication facilities. Until 1999, Japan’s ODA for infrastructure accounted to
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32% of the total ODA to Indonesia and the biggest portion of Japanese ODA went to 
the construction of dams.63 Over the years, Japan has implemented and carried out 
large-scale energy projects in this country, which includes the Asahan Hydroelectric 
Power Plant Project and the Koto Panjang Dam Project.
The Asahan Hydroelectric Power Plant Project
The Asahan Hydroelectric Power Plant Project is a long-term integrated project 
designed for:
1) Aluminium smelting factory with the capacity of 225,000 ton a year;
2) the hydroelectricity power plant located along the Asahan river west of 
Lake Toba in North Sumatra with capacity of 600 Megawatts;
3) special seaport with special seaport with three bridges, consisting of two 
bridges with the capacity of 16,000 deadweight (Dwt) and one bridge with the 
capacity of 1,000 Dwt; and
4) new residential area located at Tanhung Gading to accommodate 2,100 
workers of the Aluminum Factory.
This project was jointly implemented by the Indonesian Government, Japanese 
Government and Japanese private industry through Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. The Asahan 
Hydroelectric Power Plant Project officially started in 1975, but the Lake Toba area
65 African Forum Network on Debt and Development. The Case o f Illegitimate Debt in Indonesia. 
http://www.afrodad.org/downloads/Indonesia%20FTA%20fmal.pdf
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was the focus of Japanese, Dutch, and Soviet interests for its power development 
much earlier than the commencement of Japan’s Asaham project.
As early as 1980, the Dutch survey team firstly investigated the Lake Toba area. In 
1939, Dutch and the Netherland Indies Government cooperatively worked on 
planning to generate power on the Asahan river for aluminium production and in 1941, 
this joint venture gained the legal water right to start the project. This project was, 
however, suspended due to World War Two . After the war, some international survey 
teams, consisting of Japanese, French, American and Swedish companies, carried out 
further research on this area and submitted reports. In 1960, a Soviet investigation 
team conducted an extensive survey of hydroelectric aluminium production under 
Indonesia- the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) “Economic and Technical 
Mutual Agreement.” While relations among these two countries were strong, the 
power project was likely to be carried out by USSR. However, the Soviet 
investigation team had to leave in 1965 due to an attempted coup in Jakarta.64
It was during World War Two in 1942 that the first Japanese survey team arrived at 
Lake Toba to investigate this area but Japan had not made an agreement with 
Indonesia on detailed investigation and design of the hydroelectric plant until 1972.
At that time, Japan was eager to invest in the Aluminium production due to the then 
oil crisis followed by a substantial rise in the use of domestic power. In the meanwhile, 
the then Soeharto regime initiated a program of economic development reform, which
64 Marie Soderberg (1996) The Business o f Japanese Foreign Aid- Five case studies from Asia, 
Routledge. London. P141
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aimed to achieve regional economic development, acquisition of foreign currency and 
domestic employment expansion. Therefore, the Japanese objective was to operate the 
development-and-import scheme of Aluminium production through the Asahan 
Project and Indonesia’s motive to forge ahead with a national economic development 
policy coincided with this motive. Japan obtained water rights and a licence to operate 
the project for over 30 years as well as it received tax benefits from Indonesia. In 
1975, eight years after Japanese consulting company, Nippon Koei Co. Ltd, submitted 
the first proposal to the Indonesian Government to undertake the Asahan study and 
three years later a financial agreement was made between Indonesia and Japan, Japan 
finally commenced this Asahan project.
The Asahan Project is owned and implemented by PT Indonesia Asahan Aluminium 
(PT Inalum). PT Inalum is a joint venture between Indonesian Government and 
Nippon Asahan Alunimiun Co. Ltd, which was established in 1976. 25% of shares are 
owned by PT Inalum, a half of them are by the Nippon Asahan Aluminium Co. Ltd 
and the rest is by Japanese aluminium smelting companies and trading companies. As 
much as 61.5 billion JPY ($295 million USD) in OECF loans plus another 34 billion 
JPY ($128 million USD) in OECF investment was put into Asahan Project. Moreover, 
what seemed on the surface as a commercial transaction was actually government aid 
to Indonesia. The Japanese government provided large loans for the Indonesian 
project, (q.v. table 2)
55
Sub-thesis U4432391 Kana Ohori
As table 2 below shows, the Asahan Dam Project was long-term mega project largely 
financed by Japanese ODA, spreads over 30 years and amounts to the total cost 
of .billions of JPY. This entire cost more than doubled the 1975’s initial estimate due 
to a high rate of inflation that Japan provided and invested yen in Indonesia. Besides 
that, while this project was provided as a yen loan aid, it lacked transparency in terms 
of a full statement of account. This has not only incurred the mistrust of the Japanese 
public whose taxes are used for dubious accounts but also heavily burdened the 
Indonesian people who have an obligation to repay its debts._Japan has operated the 
Aluminium production under the 30 year contract since 1983. However, the contract 
term expires in three years in 2013. The Asahan Project will then be taken over by the 
government of Indonesia.
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Table 2. Disbursement of Japan’s bilateral loans for Asahan Project
Year Project
Amount (in 
100 million 
JPY)
1970 Asahan Hydroelectricity Power Plant 288
1976 Asahan Hydroelectricity Power Plant 2,625
1976 Asahan Development Loan (1) 2,202
1976 Asahan Hydroelectricity Power Plant 3,401
1978 Asahan Hydroelectricity Power Plant 13,700
1978 Asahan Hydroelectricity Power Plant 3,000
1978 Asahan Development Loan (2) 353
1978 Asahan Hydroelectricity Power Plant 2,149
1979 Asahan Hydroelectricity Power Plant 6,200
1980 Asahan Hydroelectricity Power Plant 12,800
1980 Asahan Hydroelectricity Power Plant 1,785
1981 Asahan Hydroelectricity Power Plant 12,100
1981 Asahan Development Project 5,340
1982 Asahan Hydroelectricity Power Plant 4,200
1982
Engineering Services for Asahan Hydroelectricity Power 
Plant Project 1,984
1983
Engineering Services for Asahan Hydroelectricity Power 
Plant Project 1,936
1986
Engineering Services for Lower Asahan River Flood Control 
Project 6,28
2006 Asahan Hydroelectricity Power Plant 27,642
Source: Japanese ODA Statistical Data and the Report o f the Registration o f Loans and Grants, Ministry o f  
Finance, March 2007
Evaluating the Asahan Dam Project
The Asahan project is categorised as highly beneficial to Japan, with less economic 
value for Indonesia.65 Considering the fact that Indonesia has produced as much as 4 
million tonnes of Aluminium over 22 years between 1982 and 2003 and Japan has 
imported 2.5 million tonnes during this period, the Asahan project was highly
65 African Forum N etw ork on D ebt and D evelopm ent. The Case o f  Illegitim ate Debt in Indonesia. 
http://ww w.afrodad.org/dow nloads/lndonesia% 20FTA % 20final.pdf
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effective to the Japanese government and investors. Equally, this project can be 
considered to fulfil Indonesia’s original intention as it contributed the country to 
gaining 1.5 million tonnes of newly laid-out land to develop domestic Aluminium 
production, increasing foreign currency earnings, raising employment (2,500 local 
people were employed) and achieving an increase in tax revenue.66
Nonetheless, the Asahan Hydroelectric Power Plant Project, if evaluated from a local 
development perspective, is not fruitful and therefore contentious. This is mainly 
because the project on a whole was designed to promote the private business of 
Japanese corporations. The loans were mainly for the interest of the Japanese 
government and corporations and PT Inalum, a major beneficiary of the loans aid, is 
authorized to control the electricity produced from the dam. In addition, the 
corruption case related to the Asahan Project came into the open when the former 
Minister of Public Works who was a chairman of Asahan Authority Body was 
reported to the Corruption Eradication Commission. The Asahan Authority Body was 
established by the then president Soeharto to support the development of local 
community and the aluminium production process. However, this Authority Body 
consisting of the highest circles caused the first corruption case related to the Asaham 
Dam project that is opened to public.67 This project therefore only primarily benefited 
the Japanese government, investors and a handful of elites in Indonesia but it did not 
assist people who had to pay debts and it did not contribute to a rise in their standard
66 Harutaka Hashimoto (2004) Is Japan ’s ODA project successful? Retrospect and prospect o f Japan ’s 
ODA policy in Indonesia. (Seikou shitato Ierunoka? Indonesia ni okeru Kokusaku ODA Project no 
Chuukan Kaiko) http://www.iist.or.ip/wffmagazineA^42/0242 J.html.
67 African Forum Network on Debt and Development. The Case o f Illegitimate Debt in Indonesia. 
http://www.afrodad.org/downloads/lndonesia%20FTA%20final.pdf
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of living.68 According to Binsar Panjaitan, the Tangga village headman, the local 
participation in this development process was very limited and what the local 
community were allowed to do during this period was to work as construction 
workers and security guards. Therefore when the project was realised, local 
employments were no more needed:
The promises of the Asahan Authority Body that the local people would be 
recruited as permanent workers in the company were only lip services.... This 
is what happens with big investment in North Sumatra. It does not bring 
benefit as all for the local communities. We are still dreaming of the fulfilment 
of the promises.69
Furthermore, the Asahan Project has apparent failures, which is resulted from an ill 
considered scheme. Due to a small quantity of precipitation at Lake Toba area, there 
has been a shortage of water, which created inadequate electricity supply in North 
Sumatra Province and underproduction of Aluminium. Besides this, the yen 
dominated loans that Japan provided to Indonesia to support the Asahan Project 
caused considerable damage to PT Inalum. In other words, because of Japan’s loan 
aid that requires PT Inalum to convert its proceeds in US dollar into the loan 
repayment in Japanese yen as well as the current rise in the value of the yen, PT 
Inalum is now required to return twice as much as it borrowed from Japanese 
government. As a result, AT Inalum has faced bankruptcy twice and a relief measure 
including additional investment from Indonesia and Japanese government, private
68 African Forum Network on Debt and Development. The Case o f Illegitimate Debt in Indonesia. 
http://www.afrodad.org/downloads/lndonesia%20FTA%20final.pdf
69 African Forum Network on Debt and Development. The Case o f Illegitimate Debt in Indonesia. 
http://www.afrodad.org/downloads/lndonesia%20FTA%20finaI.pdf
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investors and major banks and deferred loans has been taken to avoid insolvency on
70all such occasions.
Up until now, the Asahan Project has achieved the original objects that are for Japan 
to invest in power sector and import Aluminum production from Indonesia and for 
Indonesia to obtain foreign exchange and expand domestic employment. However, it 
also has produced a negative effect on Indonesia, particularly those who do not 
receive benefits from the project. That is, because PT Inalum monopolizes the market 
and the utilization of electricity, corruption occurs and the disparity between the rich 
and the poor widens. In addition, foreign debts placed a burden on the local people 
who live in poverty and are forced to move out of the area where power plants are 
built. Ironically, the development project did not bring prosperity and profits to the 
people who needed the most. It is in three years when the Japan-Indonesia contract 
over the Asahan Project expires and the government of Indonesia takes over the 
responsibility to run the project. It might be the further local employment expansion, 
clearance of foreign loans and an increase in Aluminum production without 
environmental pollution determines whether the Asahan Project on a whole is 
effective or not. Thus, it would be the key to the Indonesia’s development that both 
Indonesia and Japan push through a structural reform of Indonesia’s institution mainly 
composed of the handful elite and encourage active participation in the operation of 
the development project from the local communities and people in Indonesia. This 
will not only help both countries to make the most of the foreign aid and contribute to
70 Harutaka Hashimoto (2004) Is Japan ’s ODA project successful? Retrospect and prospect ofJapan ’s 
ODA policy in Indonesia. (Seikou shitato Ierunoka? Indonesia ni okeru Kokusaku ODA Project no 
Chuukan Kaiko) http://www.iist.or.ip/wf/magazine/0242/0242 J.html.
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the further development but also encourage Indonesia to tackle corruption and create a 
fair division of benefits from the ODA projects.
The Koto Panjang Hydroelectric Dam Project
The Koto Panjang Hydroelectric Dam Project is one of the most notorious and 
controversial Japanese ODA projects, which is also the first law case in the history to 
involving and linking Japan’s ODA human right violations and environmental 
destruction in a recipient country. The Koto Panjang Dam Project was first proposed 
in 1979 and carried out the pre-feasibility study by Tokyo Electric Power Services Co. 
Ltd (TEPSCO) in the following year. TEPSCO then presented the study result to the 
Indonesian and Japanese government, aiming to sell the scheme to both countries. 
Responding to TEPSCO’s marketing efforts and the increasing demands for 
electricity at a rate of more than 20 percent per annual in Koto Pnajang area, the 
Indonesian government decided to construct the Koto Panjang Dam with the 
financing of the Japanese government. Feasibility Study was conducted by JICA 
between 1982 and 1983 and in the following year, Andalas University of Padang 
carried out the analysis of environment impact of this project-Analisis Dampak 
Lingkungan (ANDAL). Based on Japan’s feasibility study and ANDAL, OECF 
provided a loan of 1,152 million JPY for the Engineering Service to the Indonesian 
Government in 1985. After several feasibility studies and a loan contract concluded 
between Indonesian and OECF, the construction works of the Koto Panjang
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Hydroelectric Dam finally started in 1992. The project completed in 1996 at a cost of 
approximately 31.2 billion JPY financed by Japan’s ODA.
The primary objective of the Koto Panjang Dam Project is to utilize water resources 
to produce electric power with 114 megawatts of the installed electricity generation 
capacity. The Koto Panjang Dam is located at the 10 kilometers downstream at the 
confluence of two main rivers. The lands of 124 square kilometers behind the dam 
were considered to be flooded by the reservoir. Under the construction project of Koto 
Panjang Dam with the 58 meters height and the 356 meters crest length, ten local 
villages were estimated to submerge and therefore 2,644 families were needed to be 
displaced from the area.71 At first, the project was seemingly fruitful considering the 
fact the supply of electricity increased in this area and more than 91% of households 
in the sampled village possessed rubber plantation after their relocation as opposed to 
only 55% of them owned rubber plantation on the former lands. Nevertheless, the 
Koto Panjang Dam Project has brought devastating effects rather than benefits to the 
people’s lives and surrounding environment. It is very questionable whether it was 
necessary for Japan to provide the Koto Panjang Dam project financed by its ODA 
and for Indonesia to construct the dam against the indigenous people’s will.
71 Kazuko Sumi. Compensation/Rehabilitation Issues o f People Affected by the Koto Panjang Dam in 
Indonesia and the Post-Project Legal Battle in Japan’s Courts. 
http://www.kotopan.ip/Documents/IAPS-Report(Sumi)-pdf
72 Syafiruddin Karimi. Local Economic Development and Resettlement Program. 
http://www.asiaoceania.org/abstract/hs/58-HS-A0766.pdf
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The Effectiveness of the Koto Paniang Dam
The greatest drawback of this project is a lack of the basic research on geographical 
condition in this area and insufficient consideration given to the economic and social 
impact on the local people and their traditional culture. Firstly, the Koto Panjang Dam 
did not accomplish the initial objective to produce hydroelectricity to meet the 
growing local demands for the power. Since the construction of the Koto Panjang 
Dam, the power generation has been 15% of the initial estimation and in full 
production for only five days, which is obviously not sufficient for the people’s needs. 
This is partly because the Koto Panjang Dam Project was implemented only for the 
interests of Japanese and Indonesian government, bureaucrats and investors who took 
the decision without extensive consultations and practical prospects. In addition, due 
to the construction of the Koto Panjang Dam, the lives of 4,886 families from ten 
villages were forced to relocate in spite of their petition against the proposed project. 
Responding to the growing disagreement of the people with the dam project, the 
resettlement program was designed to rehabilitate affected families’ livelihoods and 
compensate them for their lands.
The process of resettlement started in 1993 and completed in 1997 when the dam 
began to inundate. As the Koto Panjang Dam Project greatly risked the indigenous 
people’s involuntary relocation, it was expected to guarantee benefit to the affected 
villagers. The reality is, however, the affected families now live under the risk of 
impoverishment. According to Philip Hirsch and Carol Warren, more than 60 % of
63
Sub-thesis U4432391 Kana Ohori
families in West Sumatra’s Koto Panjang resettlement villages have suffered a
-7 0
worsened livelihood condition.
In an interview with Norwatch, Norwegian independent news services, Adhel 
Yesirman from the organization Yayasan Pendikan dan Batuan Hukum Indonesia 
(YPBHI) strongly emphasizes the serious impacts of the Koto Panjang Dam Project 
on the local people and their lives. According to Yesirman, the major problem of the 
resettlement due to the Koto Panjang Dam construction is the barren land provided to 
the villagers where it is impossible for them to farm and plant. Thus, most of the 
people have to work in the land around the old villages to plant and harvest so that 
they can make a living. However, in order to return to their old lands, it costs them 
1,000 Rp for the car-ride and 5000 Rp for the boat, which is equivalent to a daily pay 
of the workers in the area. Besides that, water is poorly supplied in the resettlement 
village and the people have to travel far to find or buy water. These terrible 
geographical conditions of the new villages have adversely affected the quality of 
their lives and made them even poorer. This argument of Yesirman, a lawyer and 
supporter of the Koto Panjang Dam victim, seems to be contrary to Karimi’s findings 
about the villager’s growing possession of the rubber plantation in the new region 
mentioned above. Nonetheless, this is because Karimi’s research was the focus on the 
selected sample villages and while those who can afford to pay the authorities to have 
a wider choice on the land and therefore get fertile land than the rest, the rest are
73 Philip Hirsch and Carol Warren (1998) The politics of environment in Southeast Asia: resources and 
resistance.P37. Routledge.
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forced to sell land to get their daily food because the new pieces of land are 
insufficient to feed them.74
On top of the impact on local people’s lives, the project caused the destruction of 
ecosystem in the region. That is, the Koto Panjang region was originally rich in 
aquatic resources and the indigenous people earned their living by fishery. However, 
the construction of the Koto Panjang Dam and the subsequent environmental 
destruction has driven the people to change their existing lifestyle and it has divided 
local communities from their traditional lifestyle rooted in the indigenous cultures. In 
addition, while the Japanese government promised it would protect indigenous 
animals, endangered species such as Sumatra elephants and tigers that were displaced 
because of the dam construction, most of the Sumatra elephants and tigers are now 
starved to death due to a lack of foods. Due to the dam project, a large amount of trees 
rotted and fishes disappeared, which not only caused to impair quality water of the 
reservoir but also caused a concern about a plague of wigglers followed by spread of 
malaria epidemic. This can be an adequate reason why the environmentalists and 
conservationists along with the local students and academics have supported the 
villagers and fought together against Japan’s “crime against humanity” that lies 
behind its ODA project.
Faulty planning and implementation of the Koto Panjang Dam Project is also seen in 
the unfair compensation for the affected villagers. Based on the resettlement program,
74 NorWatch. NorWatch newsletter no. 3, March 1999. 
http://www.kotopan.ip/13%20media/20020906NorWatch.html
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the affected families were to be granted compensation for their lands. However, the 
amount of compensation that Japanese government proposed was too low for the 
affected villagers to willingly agree with. As an example, while the price of land for 
vegetables, rubber and other tree crops was set at 30 Rp to 50 Rp per square meter, 
the compensation for each producing rubber tree was set at 2000 Rp, which is 
equivalent to one twentieth of the original value. In addition, the compensation for 
one coconut tree was set at 4000 Rp that values nearly one hundredth. However, in 
spite of the villagers’ dissatisfaction against the level of compensation, the Indonesia 
and Japanese Government forced the people to sign inventories of lands and houses 
without having notice of the compensation amounts.
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in 2001 notes 
“with regret that the traditional lands of indigenous peoples have been reduced or 
occupied, without their consent, by timber, mining and oil companies, at the expense 
of the exercise of their culture and the equilibrium of the ecosystem.” It also 
highlights the importance of the local participation in decisions affecting their lives.
To be precise, CESRP encourages the state to ensure that the development projects 
are carried out upon proper consultation and with the prior consent of the local people. 
In spite of increasing international recognition of the human right of the indigenous 
peoples on the process of developmental project, Japanese ODA does not 
accommodate and respect to the local people and lacks accountability for decisions
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made. This is highly disapproving in addressing the concerns of the indigenous 
peoples with regard to development intervention. ^
While the Koto Panjang Dam Project is considered as one of the most well known 
examples of Japanese ODA for its diplomatic and commercial purposes, it is doubtful 
whether or not this project brought benefits and prosperity even for Japan. That is, this 
is the first legal action on the history that Japanese government, JICA, JBIC (merged 
with OECF in 1999) and cooperating companies were sued by a recipient country for 
its ODA project and Japanese government is more strongly condemned for its aid and 
foreign policy by international society. It seems not only Japan has not achieved an 
ulterior motive in providing the ODA projects as a means of diplomacy but also the 
country has been loosing its face in international arena. Needless to say, some of the 
Japanese consultant companies and stakeholders have made a high profit out of its 
involvement in Japanese ODA projects. However, the point that should be underlined 
here is that, as Marie Soderberg mentioned above, a relation between a donor and 
recipient is not one-sided but mutual. In other words, it was the Indonesian 
government and a sprinkling of the elites at national and regional level who exploited 
the ODA projects and financial resources provided by Japan, which reflected the then 
Suharto regime and Indonesia’s bureaucratic institution full of corruption and 
inefficiency.
75 United Nations. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). Poverty and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights. 10. May. 2001 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/518e88bfb89822c9c 1256a4e004df048?Qpendocument
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According to Pauh Tanjung, a villager affected by this project, there were some cases 
of corruption reported behind the resettlement program and compensation system. For 
instance, the former village leader, Haji Syukur, is suspected to have received 
compensation of more than 300,000,000 Rp, which was hundreds times as much as 
the rest of the affected villagers, because his property in Tanjung Paul was registered 
to be compensated. The same process was applied to all of his kinship and none of 
them were denied compensation for their belongings and properties. Moreover, the 
regional authority body gave the leaders of eight villages, who at first disagreed with 
the resettlement program, motorbikes as an incentive to consent to the resettlement 
and the amount of compensation for their lands. The authorities then brought 
documents which they wanted the village inhabitants to sign without proper 
explanation of what the document was. Not all of the village chiefs signed this and 
many do not even remember if they have signed this. However, after a meeting with 
the village leaders, the authorities presented a letter of consent for signing to the local 
villagers and they threatened them by saying that if they did not sign and agree, they 
would not get any compensation at all. Many signed the documents on belongings and 
compensation rates and the authorities used these signatures to receive OECF’s 
funding, without these affected families’ recognition. Up until now, as many as 168 
affected villagers are waiting for the compensation provided, but this has not yet 
realised.
A serious defect in the Koto Panjang Dam Hydroelectric Project is the inevitable 
effect resulted from Japanese excessive pursuit of its national interest and disregard of
76 NorWatch. Nor Watch newsletter no. 3, March 1999. 
http://www.kotopan.ip/13%20media/20020906NorWatch.html
77 NorWatch. NorWatch newsletter no. 3, March 1999. 
http://www.kotopan.ip/13%20media/20020906NorWatch.html
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the local people’s lifestyle and environment as well as the Suharto’s bad 
governance. Most of the compensation has disappeared on its way through the corrupt 
bureaucracy before it reaches the people who really need it. The documents about 
belongings signed by the village inhabitants were also manipulated by the
•  78committee.
Although the Koto Panjang Dam Project is not one of the major or most successful 
projects financed by Japanese government, it was in the world spotlight as the first 
law case that a recipient country took Japan to court for its ODA with this case still 
being tried at a higher court in Japan. This incident is a huge blot on the history of 
Japan’s ODA, but with this as a start, Japan in transition is expected to re-examine 
and consider how it can improve the implementation of is ODA in order to avoid such 
incidents in the future.
How Effective and Practical Has Japan’s ODA Been to Both Japan and Indonesia?
While Japan’s ODA system and method often attracts criticism from the international
society and dissenting voices of how to use the state coffers in the worldwide
recession is heard among the general public, the government of Japan maintains a
positive stance on its involvement in the ODA project. This is because there are
motives for Japan’s ODA behind its contribution to international development and
achievement of the MDGs. According to a servery conducted by the Kokusai
Kaihatsu Journal, while Japan’s aid motivation should be humanitarian and altruistic,
78 NorWatch. NorWatch newsletter no. 3, March 1999. 
http://www.kotopan.ip/13%20media/20020906NorWatch.html
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many of the Japanese aid experts who participated in the servery questioned whether 
the ultimate objective for Japan’s ODA is to promote the national interest, including 
securing natural resources and increasing investment, through strengthening 
relationship with other countries.
The case study of Japan’s ODA projects at the Asahan Dam and the Koto Panjang 
Dam also demonstrated Japanese commercial and diplomatic purposes behind its 
ODA project and Japanese-Indonesian special relationship developed for the mutual 
benefits. That is, although Japanese involvement in the ODA program has not directly 
brought prosperity and high returns to the Japanese citizens, Japan has expanded 
foreign trade and secured the national resources. Some of the Japanese companies and 
investors has also made big profits through the ODA projects as a result of providing 
a large amount of ODA to a targeted country. Additionally, due to the Japanese ODA 
system which is mostly financed by the nation’s coffers and postal savings, Japan has 
provided a low grant element of yen loan aid to a recipient country and not much loss 
can be suffered. Thus, it is not an exaggeration to say that Japan has attained the 
objectives of a participation in the ODA program if its true basis is to further Japan’s 
own national interests. However, the quality of Japanese ODA, if evaluated from 
humanitarian perspective, has not yet reached the global standard among DAC 
countries. Therefore, the country has not yet fulfilled its responsibility as a world 
economic power nor contributed greatly to the achievement of the MDGs in terms of 
aid effectiveness on the international development.
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Meanwhile, Japanese ODA has not been very effective to the regional development 
and those who need the foreign assistant the most in Indonesia. This is because the 
financial resources including Japanese foreign aid has been, in many cases, 
manipulated by corrupt governments and bureaucracies in Indonesia. Also, the 
assistance provided by Japan disappears before it reaches to the local people. This is 
mainly because Indonesia’s institutions do not possess the administrative competence 
nor have a capacity to make effective use of the development project. Thus, it is very 
challenging for both Japanese and Indonesian government to plan and implement the 
ODA projects effectively unless they have a feasible project, the sound government 
and strong institutions. Also, a lack of extensive research and insightful aid scheme as 
well as little regard for the influence upon the indigenous people’s lifestyle and their 
surroundings has caused a huge damage to a recipient country, particularly those who 
are in needy circumstances. Accordingly, Japan’s immoderate insistence on 
promoting the national interests has prevented Indonesia’s social and economic 
development at a community level.
The Asahan Dam Project and the Koto Panjang Dam Project are only two examples 
out of hundreds of Japanese ODA projects and these are not a whole picture of the 
current Japan’s ODA system. However, as seen in these case studies, Japanese ODA 
will possibly produce a stronger effect on Indonesia’s development when Japan sets 
aside the national interest and Indonesia has a full system in place to receive the aid 
flow and to encourage a greater participation of the local people in a project planning, 
implementation and decision making.
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How can Japan’s PDA Improve its Quality and Contribute Sustainably to 
Development in a Recipient Country?
While the involvement of Japan’s ODA program brings prosperity to the country, it 
often causes a negative impact rather than positive effect on the local people’s 
lifestyle, culture and environment. This is partly attributed to Japanese inconsistent 
aid policy, shortsighted development scheme and a twofold purpose behind the 
involvement in the ODA program. In addition, without strong institutions in a 
recipient country, foreign assistance is misappropriated by corrupt elites before the 
local people have a share in the benefit of the foreign assistance. It is sine qua non that 
a recipient country must have the capacity to receive the foreign assistance to cope 
with the administration consequences that flow from a flood of foreign aid. This 
enables recipient countries to utilize this assistance properly for Indonesia’s further 
development. Therefore effective recipient institutions are a decisive factor to 
determine whether ODA projects contribute to effective development in Indonesia.
Supporting this, Kiyokazu Koshida (2006) highlights Japan is now required to re­
examine the current state of the ODA program and its effects on recipient countries. 
According to Koshida, the quality of ODA was heretofore evaluated based on a ratio 
of grant aid, grant element and untied rate and therefore it was the general recognition 
among DAC members that the higher a rate of grant aid and grant element index are, 
the better the ODA project is. However, now that Japan, like other developed 
countries, is slowly coming out of the current global economic recession and faces 
difficulties to find a means to provide ODA, a product and effect on the recipient’s
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country rather than good conditions of the project decides value of the project. In 
other words, with the severe funding limitations, the top priority of Japanese ODA 
projects should be to ensure sustainable economic development in a recipient country 
at a grassroots level rather than to provide abundant financial resources or a large 
number of projects that might not bring any benefit to the people. This, to be specific, 
means that Japanese quality ODA should primarily encourage recipients to carry 
through structural reforms through its intervention and monitoring in the domestic 
policies as well as institutions upon mutual agreements.
To achieve this, it is vital that the Japanese government restructure its bureaucratic 
ODA system. Likewise, it is a priority issue for Indonesia to prioritize aid projects 
that produce positive effects at the local level. It is also necessary that the country 
strengthens institutions to make the most of the projects provided. When all the 
conditions are established, it will be a time when participation of the locals in 
planning and implement the project should be promoted and Japanese ODA project 
works promptly and effectively in Indonesia.
In addition to improving the effectiveness of Indonesia’s institutions and making 
Japanese ODA policy more consistent, the type of ODA projects Japan provides 
seems to be a key to improve the quality of Japan’s ODA. That is, there are many 
arguments that Japan should channel more of its ODA into addressing the basic needs
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of social development and poverty reduction and allow more of the financial and 
infrastructural requirements to be satisfied through the market in a recipient country.79
Some of this can be achieved by shifting foreign aid to social sectors and by focusing 
more on the countries and people that need it the most. However, it is also worth 
mentioning that Japan has traditionally provided a yen loan focused on infrastructure 
projects to recipient countries and due to the Japanese ODA resource financed by the 
state coffers and public postal savings, it is difficult for Japan to allocate its funding 
for the ODA to a grant aid focused on social infrastructure. However, assuming Japan 
continues to provide a yen loan on the hard infrastructure basis as in the past, it is 
important the country changes its approach to launching the project. For instance, the 
Asahan Dam Hydroelectric Project and the Kato Panjang Dam Hydroelectric Project 
were fruitless attempts in terms of Indonesia’s regional development. This is mostly 
attributed to Japan’s insufficient research on the targeted area, disregard for the 
indigenous people’s human right and excessive pursue of the national interests as well 
as Indonesia’s bad governance. Nevertheless, these dam projects could have made a 
profound impact on the local people if Japan has had a comprehensive grasp of the 
project and given Indonesia an inclusive support from the construction of the dam to 
the managerial strategy for the power plants including establishing electric rate and 
instructing management policy. These lessons of Japan’s fault for its imperfect 
projects should be therefore applied to the next.
79 Tatehiko, Kondou. ODA and MicroFinance (ODA to Micro Finance). 
http://www.mof.go.ip/finance/fl609b.pdf
80 Kiyokazu Koshida (2006) Re-examination o f a partnership between ODA and NGO (ODA to NGO 
no Partnership Saikou) in Examination o f  Japan’s ODA. Ppl07- 178
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As another element of aid effectiveness, Tatehiko Kondou points out the significance 
of local involvement in development project and an economic cooperation between 
local government and external partners. According to Kondou, Japan’s economic 
development approaches contain the following mingled objectives:
1) a self-help effort system;
2) mutual interests between Japan and a recipient;
3) a state led economy and long-term development plans;
(4) efficient public- private cooperation;
5) an aim to establish Asian economic bloc in the future whose motives can be
achieved by a partnership between local government and external actors.
That is to say, local participation and efforts are inseparable from its own successful 
development. The role of external partners, namely donor countries, is to help and 
provide what local ownerships need for their sustainable development. Foreign capital 
and advice, especially advanced technology from developed countries, would not be 
used effectively unless the people show a willingness and commitment to carry their 
own economic development projects.81
81 Tatehiko, Kondou. ODA and Micro Finance (ODA to Micro Finance) 
http://www.mof.go.jp/finance/fl609b.pdf
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Foreign Aid and Non-Government Organisations
Similarly, Kiyokazu Koshida puts a great emphasis on the importance of Japan’s 
partnership with Non Government Organizations (NGOs) in order to achieve the 
quality ODA. According to Koshida, there are two major reasons why the Japanese 
government should provide a larger amount of funds and strengthen partnerships with 
NGOs. Firstly, NGOs have generally wider knowledge about the local people, 
environment and their culture in a recipient country and they are more likely to 
provide effective and practical assistance to the people at the grassroots level. The 
partnership between Japanese ODA and NGOs are therefore complementary to each 
other. This not only produces good results to Indonesia’s further development but also 
helps Japan to regain the trust from the general public, recipient countries and the 
international society. Secondly, active support for its NGOs gives Japanese 
government an opportunity to re-examine the present state of the ODA system and 
adopt a radical foreign aid reform if needed. This is because while Japanese 
government provides ODA as a means of a national strategy, the ultimate objective of 
foreign assistance from NGOs is to obviate the global need for ODA by working on a 
rise in the standard of living in development country and eradicating poverty through 
the world. As a good example of this, humanitarian assistance Japan provided to East 
Timor after the conflict was mostly through international organisations and NGOs. 
This is not only because Japan lacked a clear policy and deliberate decision making 
on humanitarian aid but also because these international organizations and the 
grassroots of NGOs had extensive networks of collaborators and financiers in the 
stricken area. Compared with NGOs in other DAC countries, Japanese NGOs are
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poorly funded and in difficulty to run its own project even if it is a worthwhile scheme. 
Therefore coordination between the government and NGOs diversify Japanese 
international cooperation, which results in a higher level of aid effectiveness within a 
limited funding.82
Micro Finance
The last point that should be underlined to make Japan’s ODA more effective is the 
significance of micro finance in a recipient country. To be precise, as the necessity of 
microfinance in a developing country is internationally and domestically urged among 
academics and some governmental authorities, Japan is more expected to adopt a full- 
scale of microfinance. As widely recognized, microfinance is the provision of 
financial services to low-income clients, mostly destitute families and female farmers 
who lack access to banking services. So far the potentiality of “two-step loan” system 
where Japan grants a loan to the needy people through a recipient government and 
financial institution has been discussed among the Japanese bureaucrats and 
politicians and Japan has shown a positive attitude toward microeconomics. However, 
the amount of loan provided with Japan’s two step loan system is too large to perform 
a function at full efficiency and meet the original objective of microfinance.
82 Kiyokazu Koshida (2006) Re-examination o f  a partnership between ODA and NGO (ODA to NGO 
no Partnership Saikou) in Examination o f  Japan’s ODA. P161
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According to Kondou, a main reason why microfinance is effective to Japan and a 
recipient country is because microfinance is consistent with Japanese fundamental 
philosophy of its ODA in self help effort. That is, because microfmance has a 
structure where the client should earn income by a small business, save some of the 
earnings and general further profits, it can support domestic currency system and 
encourage self help efforts as opposed to dependency upon financial resources 
provided by a donor which is seen in the existing ODA system. In order to achieve 
all-out effort through microfmance is, however, the country need to establish 
permanent local institutions. In addition, the local government is expected to enable 
sustainable financial services and the shortage of effective institutions can be a key 
factor that delays development and progress in that country. Thus the strong 
institution is again considered as a decisive element of aid effectiveness. In short, it is 
foreseen that Japanese ODA projects will be more effective and beneficial to 
Indonesia’s grassroots development when the government of Japan and Indonesia 
meet the following factors; Japan’s coherent ODA policy and comprehensive aid 
scheme; a close partnership with NGOs; greater coordination with the local 
government; and Indonesia’s effective institution as well as a greater degree of local 
participation in development projects.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
Japan’s ODA program is highly controversial and the quality of Japan’s aid is 
questionable. An examination of the impact of Japanese ODA in Indonesia, 
particularly the case studies discussed in this thesis, reveal the issues that stand in the 
way of true effectiveness. There are compound reasons that explain why Japanese 
governments, like others, spend huge amounts of money from the coffers of the state 
to assist developing countries. One reason is the contribution to the achievement of 
the MDGs from humanitarian perspective- it is considered as an obligation of wealthy 
nation to help poverty alleviation and improve the standard of living elsewhere in the 
world. Without exception, Japan also includes this justification in its policy 
statements and explains its obligation as a world economic power is the great 
consequence of Japan’s involvement in the ODA program.
In this context, it goes without saying that the aid given by Japan should reach the 
people and countries that need it the most and should help those who suffer abject 
poverty. In reality, however, the motive of ODA often includes the national interest 
and does not simply reflect a nation’s compassion and altruism to developing 
countries. It is clearly seen in a relationship between Japan and a recipient, Japanese 
aid policy and method as well as a type of program and assistance that Japan provides 
ODA to a recipient country in pursuit of national interest. This is because foreign aid 
is often used as diplomatic, commercial and political measures and a donor-recipient
83 William Nester (1992) Japan and the Third World.
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relation is rather reciprocal. That is, Japan provides a huge amount of ODA as a 
means of securing its natural resources, establishing stable relationships with 
neighboring countries and welding its stronger presence on the international arena. In 
the meanwhile, Japanese ODA projects seemingly bring a lot of benefits to a recipient 
country because these projects contribute to expanding domestic employment, 
promoting the acquisition of foreign currency and raising local awareness about 
development, which eventually encourages economic growth in the recipient country.
On due consideration of the Asahan Dam Project and the Koto Panjang Dam Project, 
the Japanese government provided a considerable amount of yen loans, which resulted 
in Japan promoting its profitable investment, stimulating local Japanese capitalized 
companies and increasing the imports of Aluminum that is supposedly produced by 
the dams financed by Japan’s ODA. Equally, Indonesia obtained a better supply of 
electricity and stimulated employment by the construction of these dam plants.
However, it is also fair to say that foreign aid which is intended to assist the poor does 
not always assist those who actually need it and, in many cases, is more beneficial to 
the donor and only a handful of elites in a recipient country. To make matters worse, 
recipient countries are, in some cases, burdened with repayments due to Japanese 
government loans and plagued with foreign debt due to the Japanese ODA system. To 
prove this, both the Asahan and the Koto Panjang Dam were constructed by a huge 
amount of yen loan and, regardless of its actual effectiveness, the Indonesian people 
are bound to repay the debt for decades to come. This is partly attributed to a 
fundamental idea of Japan’s self-help aid based on yen loans, its infrastructure
80
Sub-thesis U4432391 Kana Ohori
focused aid projects, aid funds borne by the public purse and Asia-centered aid 
allocation. As a result, while the involvement of Japan’s ODA projects, in many cases, 
brings high returns and economic revival to the country, it is not beneficial to the 
people and local communities from developmental sustainability perspective.
In addition, without effective institutions in a recipient country to absorb foreign 
assistance and sound aid projects provided by donors, foreign assistance is diverted by 
corrupt politicians, bureaucrats and national/local elites to their own pockets before it 
is rendered to the people. Eliminating the corruption among these bureaucrats and a 
handful of elites is the first priority to Indonesia’s development and further 
achievement. The case studies mentioned above demonstrate some bribe cases related 
to the dam projects. In many cases, politician, bureaucrats, elite businessmen and 
local authorities make illicit use of financial resources including ODA and the needy 
people can not participate in the profit produced by foreign aid. For example, in Aceh, 
it received approximately $6 billion USD foreign aid after the devastating Indian 
Ocean earthquake in 2004. However, there was a global concern whether money 
provided was used properly and, if so, how effectively it was spent for the post­
disaster reconstruction and further development. As these examples illustrate, the 
financial resources for Indonesia’s development often disappear before it reaches to 
the local people and communities due to the corrupt government and institutions. 
Therefore, Indonesia is required to establish stronger institutions that are capable of 
dealing with the flow of aid, raising the level of transparency in the management of 
foreign aid and making the most of the financial resources provided the country for 
further development.
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Over the years, Japanese ODA has attracted criticism from the international societies 
and its own value has been being questioned. That is traditionally attributed to 
Japanese aid system on the basis of a yen loan, the type of aid projects focused on the 
hard infrastructure, a high rate of grant element and a choice of recipient country that 
has a closer diplomatic and commercial relationship with Japan. It is understandable 
that the country intends to promote its national interests through the involvement of 
its ODA project because the ODA funds mostly come from the national coffers and 
public saving and therefore it needs to realize some kind of profits on behalf of the 
general public. However, it is also a donor’s obligation to ensure that the foreign 
assistance provided by Japan brings a positive effect to the recipient country, 
particularly those who live in grinding poverty. In other words, as long as Japan 
contributes to ODA projects, either it is a grant or loan, it has to be beneficial not only 
to Japan but also the recipient.
To produce the desired result through the ODA project, Japan is now expected to re­
examine the present and future state of its ODA system. To be precise, Japan’s future 
ODA needs a coherent aid policy and comprehensive development scheme, a closer 
partnership with a recipient’s local community, a greater degree of cooperation with a 
grassroots NGOs and a change in its approach toward the project management and 
monitoring. When the recipient country and Japan meet the necessary and sufficient 
conditions to make the most of the ODA program, these countries then should join 
together to encourage the participation of the local people in planning, implementing 
and decision making on development.
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In conclusion, the key factors that determine whether Japanese ODA projects produce 
a strong effect on a recipient’s grassroots development is Japan’s consistent aid policy 
and a recipient’s ability to absorb the flow of aid. Thus, sound Japanese projects based 
on prior feasible research, consultation and consent of the local people, coordination 
with NGOs and the local recipients as well as effective recipient institutions are of 
great importance to improve the quality of Japan’s ODA to Indonesia.
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